JS Ex Rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School Dist.
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 11947, 91 A.L.R. 6th 687, 650 F.3d 915 (2011)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A school district may not punish a student for off-campus speech that is vulgar and offensive but does not cause a substantial disruption at school and could not reasonably be forecasted to cause one. The standard from Bethel School District v. Fraser, which permits regulation of lewd and vulgar speech, is confined to the on-campus context and does not apply to off-campus expression.
Facts:
- J.S., an eighth-grade student, was disciplined on two occasions by her middle school principal, James McGonigle, for dress code violations.
- On a Sunday, from her personal computer at home, J.S. and a friend created a fake MySpace profile parodying McGonigle.
- The profile contained McGonigle's official school photograph but did not use his name; it was filled with vulgar language, crude humor, and false, sexually explicit accusations about him and his family.
- The content was so outrageous and juvenile that the record indicates no one took its allegations seriously.
- The day after creating the profile, J.S. changed its privacy setting to 'private,' limiting access to approximately 22 student 'friends' whom she approved.
- The school district's computers blocked access to MySpace, preventing any student from viewing the profile at school.
- Principal McGonigle learned of the profile from another student and specifically requested that this student bring a printout of it to school, which was the only copy ever brought onto school grounds.
Procedural Posture:
- J.S. and her parents filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Blue Mountain School District, Superintendent Romberger, and Principal McGonigle in the U.S. District Court (trial court).
- By stipulation, all claims against the individual defendants were dismissed, leaving the School District as the sole defendant.
- Both parties moved for summary judgment.
- The District Court granted summary judgment for the School District, concluding that while no 'substantial disruption' under Tinker occurred, the school could punish the speech because it was 'vulgar and offensive' under Fraser and had an 'effect' on campus.
- J.S. and her parents, as appellants, filed a timely appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit against the School District, the appellee.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a school district violate a student's First Amendment free speech rights by suspending her for creating a vulgar, satirical social media profile of her principal from her home computer on a weekend, when the speech did not cause and could not reasonably be forecasted to cause a substantial disruption at school?
Opinions:
Majority - Chagares, J.
Yes. The school district's suspension of J.S. violated her First Amendment free speech rights because her off-campus speech did not cause a substantial disruption in school and could not have reasonably led school officials to forecast one. The court, assuming without deciding that Tinker v. Des Moines applies, found that the actual disruption—some students talking in class for a few minutes—was minimal and did not meet the 'materially and substantially interfere' standard. Comparing the facts to Tinker, where wearing armbands to protest the Vietnam War was deemed non-disruptive, the court concluded J.S.'s outrageous, joke profile could not be reasonably forecasted to cause a substantial disruption. Furthermore, the court rejected the application of Bethel School District v. Fraser's exception for 'lewd' and 'vulgar' speech, reasoning that Supreme Court precedent explicitly limits Fraser's applicability to the on-campus school environment. The fact that a copy of the profile was brought to school at the principal's own request does not convert the student's off-campus speech into on-campus speech.
Dissenting - Fisher, J.
No. The school district's suspension of J.S. did not violate her First Amendment rights because it was reasonably foreseeable that her speech would cause a substantial disruption. The majority minimizes the malicious nature of J.S.'s speech, which included serious, albeit false, accusations of sexual misconduct against a school official. Such attacks foreseeably undermine a principal's authority and can disrupt the educational environment by causing psychological harm to staff and diverting school resources to address the fallout. Unlike the passive, political speech in Tinker, J.S.'s speech was a targeted, vulgar, personal attack broadcast to the school community. The dissent argues that the majority's decision creates a circuit split with the Second Circuit, which has found that hostile off-campus internet speech directed at school officials can create a foreseeable risk of substantial disruption.
Concurring - Smith, J.
Yes. The school district violated J.S.'s First Amendment rights, but for a more fundamental reason than the majority's. The Tinker 'substantial disruption' test should not apply to off-campus speech at all. The First Amendment should protect students' off-campus speech to the same extent it protects speech by adults in the community. Tinker and its progeny are expressly grounded in the 'special characteristics of the school environment' and were not intended to grant schools authority to regulate student expression that occurs at home, on a weekend, and is not directed at the school. Applying Tinker to off-campus speech would give schools ominous, overbroad power to censor student expression anywhere, anytime, on any subject. Because J.S.'s speech occurred entirely off-campus, it should receive full First Amendment protection.
Analysis:
This decision significantly curtails a school's authority to discipline students for online speech created off-campus. By holding that the Tinker 'substantial disruption' standard requires a tangible, reasonably foreseeable disruption, the court sets a high bar for intervention. More importantly, it creates a clear jurisdictional line by refusing to extend the Fraser standard for lewd and vulgar speech beyond the schoolhouse gate, protecting students' off-campus expression even when it is highly offensive. The separate concurrence highlights a key ongoing debate in First Amendment law: whether traditional school speech doctrines like Tinker are appropriate for the digital age or if a bright-line rule is needed to prevent schools from policing students' private lives.
