Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson
343 U.S. 495 (1952)
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Rule of Law:
Expression by means of motion pictures is included within the free speech and free press guarantees of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. A state may not, therefore, engage in the prior restraint of a film on the basis of a censor's conclusion that it is 'sacrilegious,' as such a standard is unconstitutionally vague.
Facts:
- Joseph Burstyn, Inc. is a corporation that distributes motion pictures.
- The corporation acquired the exclusive rights to distribute an Italian film titled 'The Miracle'.
- Initially, the Motion Picture Division of the New York Education Department issued a license authorizing the public exhibition of 'The Miracle'.
- The film was publicly shown in a New York City theater for approximately eight weeks.
- Following public protests and communications sent to the New York State Board of Regents, the Board reviewed the film.
- The Board of Regents determined that 'The Miracle' was 'sacrilegious'.
- As a result of this determination, the Commissioner of Education rescinded the corporation's license to exhibit the film.
Procedural Posture:
- Joseph Burstyn, Inc. brought an action under Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Act in the New York state court system to review the Board of Regents' determination to rescind its film license.
- The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court, an intermediate appellate court, upheld the Regents' determination.
- Joseph Burstyn, Inc. (appellant) appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, the state's highest court.
- The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the Appellate Division.
- Joseph Burstyn, Inc. then appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States.
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Issue:
Does a state statute that permits officials to ban a motion picture on the ground that it is 'sacrilegious' impose an unconstitutional prior restraint on free speech in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Clark
Yes. A state statute that permits the banning of a motion picture on the basis that it is 'sacrilegious' is an unconstitutional prior restraint on free speech. Motion pictures are a significant medium for the communication of ideas and are included within the free speech and free press guarantees of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, explicitly overturning the precedent set in Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n. While this protection is not absolute, the New York statute imposes a prior restraint, which is a heavily disfavored form of censorship. The term 'sacrilegious' is not a narrow exception and is unconstitutionally vague; it sets a censor 'adrift upon a boundless sea' with no clear standards, forcing the censor to favor certain religious orthodoxies over others. The state has no legitimate interest in protecting religions from views distasteful to them that is sufficient to justify such a prior restraint on expression.
Concurring - Justice Reed
Yes. While not foreclosing the possibility that a state could establish a system for licensing motion pictures, the film in this case is not of a character that the First Amendment permits a state to exclude from public view. The specific refusal to license this film was an unconstitutional act.
Concurring - Justice Frankfurter
Yes. The judgment should be affirmed because the statutory standard 'sacrilegious' is unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The term has no settled, definite meaning in law or common speech, which is demonstrated by a thorough review of its lexicographical and historical usage. This vagueness fails to provide fair notice to filmmakers of what is prohibited and provides no objective standards for censors or for judicial review, effectively giving administrative officials unfettered discretion. This is particularly dangerous when the standard seeks to restrict expression concerning religious matters, where views are widely disparate and conflicting.
Analysis:
This case is a landmark First Amendment decision that formally extended free speech and press protections to motion pictures, overturning the 37-year-old precedent of Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n. By recognizing films as a significant medium for ideas rather than mere entertainment or business, the Court severely curtailed the power of state and local censorship boards. While the ruling specifically targeted the vague term 'sacrilegious' and did not outlaw all film censorship, it established a foundation for future challenges against prior restraints and paved the way for greater artistic freedom in the film industry, particularly concerning controversial religious or social themes.
