Jordan v. Lusby
81 S.W.3d 523, 2002 Ky. App. LEXIS 1399, 2002 WL 1488673 (2002)
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Rule of Law:
Under Kentucky law, a professional dog groomer who accepts a dog for grooming is considered an "owner" under KRS 258.095(5) and assumes the inherent risk of her profession, thereby insulating the legal owner from strict liability for a dog bite under KRS 258.275, absent evidence of the legal owner's specific knowledge of the dog's vicious propensity.
Facts:
- Kathy Jordan, a professional dog groomer, accepted Kevin Lusby’s Chow dog for grooming.
- Jordan claimed she accepted the dog only after she was assured the dog would not bite, and that Lusby had knowledge the dog would bite without provocation.
- Jordan finished grooming the dog.
- As Jordan was carrying Lusby's dog out of the room, it bit her once on the face.
- In her deposition, Jordan stated she had groomed Chows before and did not normally use a muzzle unless she had some sign that the dog was likely to bite.
- There was no evidence in the record indicating the dog had previously bitten anyone, nor that Lusby had actual knowledge it would bite, beyond a statement that the dog "did not like men."
Procedural Posture:
- Kathy Jordan filed an action against Kevin Lusby in Jefferson Circuit Court, claiming strict liability under Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 258.275.
- Kevin Lusby filed a motion for summary judgment.
- The Jefferson Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of Lusby on December 28, 2000.
- Jordan appealed the circuit court's judgment to the Kentucky Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does a professional dog groomer, who accepts a dog for grooming, become an "owner" under KRS 258.095(5) and assume the risk of being bitten, thereby precluding a strict liability claim against the dog's legal owner under KRS 258.275?
Opinions:
Majority - TACKETT, Judge
Yes, a professional dog groomer who accepts a dog for grooming becomes an "owner" under the statute and assumes the inherent risk of her profession, thus precluding a strict liability claim against the dog's legal owner. The court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Lusby. Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 258.095(5) defines an "owner" broadly to include "every person who keeps or harbors the dog, or has it in his care, or permits it to remain on or about premises owned by him," expanding liability beyond mere property interest to those who temporarily care for dogs. The court adopted the reasoning from Tschida v. Berdusco, a Minnesota case, which held that such a statute insulates the legal owner from liability to a "second party owner" (like a groomer or veterinarian assistant) because the second party, by taking custody, also becomes an "owner" responsible for injuries. Furthermore, the court held that Jordan, as a professional dog groomer, assumed the risk of being bitten, which is inherent in her profession. Drawing persuasive authority from Nelson v. Hall, a California case involving a veterinarian's assistant, the court reasoned that a professional dealing with animals cannot be deemed to have unreasonably encountered a risk inherent in their job, making assumption of risk a complete defense. Jordan failed to present evidence that Lusby had specific knowledge of the dog's violent disposition that would create a genuine issue of material fact.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the scope of dog owner liability in Kentucky, particularly concerning professionals in the animal care industry. By interpreting "owner" broadly under KRS 258.095(5), the court limits the legal owner's strict liability when temporary care has been transferred to another party, effectively shifting responsibility to the party in immediate control. The robust application of the assumption of risk doctrine for professionals provides a strong defense for dog owners against claims from groomers, veterinarians, or kennel operators, unless specific knowledge of a dog's viciousness can be proven. This decision encourages professionals to take precautions and acknowledges the inherent risks of their chosen fields.
