Jones v. United States
529 U.S. 848 (2000)
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Rule of Law:
The federal arson statute, 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), which criminalizes the destruction of any property used in or affecting interstate commerce, does not apply to an owner-occupied private residence not used for any commercial purpose.
Facts:
- Dewey Jones's cousin owned and occupied a home in Fort Wayne, Indiana, which he used solely as a private residence.
- The residence was not used for any commercial undertaking or business activity.
- The homeowner used the dwelling as collateral to secure a mortgage from a lender in Oklahoma.
- The homeowner obtained a casualty insurance policy on the residence from an insurer in Wisconsin.
- The residence received natural gas from sources outside of Indiana.
- On February 23, 1998, Dewey Jones threw a Molotov cocktail into his cousin's home.
- The resulting fire caused severe damage to the residence.
Procedural Posture:
- A federal grand jury indicted Dewey Jones for arson under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) and two other counts.
- Jones was tried and convicted by a jury on all three counts in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana.
- Jones appealed his conviction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, arguing that the statute exceeded Congress's Commerce Clause authority as applied to a private residence.
- The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction and judgment of the District Court.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to review the Seventh Circuit's decision.
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Issue:
Does the federal arson statute, 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), apply to the arson of an owner-occupied private residence that is not actively used for any commercial purpose?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Ginsburg
No. An owner-occupied residence not used for any commercial purpose does not qualify as property 'used in' an activity affecting interstate commerce, and therefore its arson is not a federal crime under § 844(i). The statute requires that the property itself be 'used in' a commerce-affecting activity, which is most sensibly read to mean active employment for commercial purposes, not a passive or past connection to commerce. The government’s argument that receiving an out-of-state mortgage, insurance, or natural gas constitutes such a use is overly broad and would render the limiting phrase 'used in' as surplusage, extending federal jurisdiction to virtually every building in the nation. This interpretation is guided by the principle of constitutional avoidance, as a broader reading would raise serious Commerce Clause questions under the precedent of United States v. Lopez, which limited federal power over non-economic, traditionally local criminal conduct. Furthermore, principles of lenity and federalism caution against interpreting a federal criminal statute to significantly alter the federal-state balance without a clear statement from Congress.
Concurring - Justice Stevens
Yes, I concur with the Court's statutory construction and write to emphasize the importance of preserving the federal-state balance in law enforcement. There is a strong reluctance to assume Congress intended to authorize federal intervention in local law enforcement. Federal criminal laws that overlap with traditional state authority, such as arson, should be interpreted narrowly unless congressional intent to assert federal jurisdiction is unmistakably clear. The significant disparity between Jones's 35-year federal sentence and the 10-year maximum state penalty illustrates how such federal statutes can displace state policy choices.
Concurring - Justice Thomas
Yes, I join the Court's opinion but write separately to express no view on whether 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), as construed by the Court, is constitutional in its application to all buildings used for commercial activities. This leaves open the question of the statute's constitutionality even as applied to commercial properties.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies and narrows the scope of the federal arson statute, 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). Following the trajectory of United States v. Lopez, the decision reflects the Court's continued effort to place meaningful limits on Congress's Commerce Clause power, particularly in areas of traditional state concern like local crime. By employing the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, the Court avoided a direct Commerce Clause ruling but signaled that a property's mere passive connection to interstate commerce is insufficient to establish federal jurisdiction. This holding requires lower courts to focus on the 'active employment' of a property for commercial purposes, thereby reasserting the importance of federalism and preventing a vast expansion of federal criminal law.
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