Jones v. State
2013 Fla. App. LEXIS 9929, 114 So. 3d 1123, 2013 WL 3467088 (2013)
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Rule of Law:
In an entrapment defense, evidence of a defendant's criminal conduct occurring after initial law enforcement inducement but before the charged offense, which itself stems from the same inducement, is admissible to prove the defendant's predisposition to commit the crime if the circumstances demonstrate the defendant was an "unwary criminal" rather than an "unwary innocent."
Facts:
- In June 2011, undercover Escambia County Sheriff's Deputy Jason Gilmore had a conversation with Roderick Delano Jones, asking if Jones could "get possession of... drugs."
- On July 15, 2011, Jones went to a fictitious second-hand store, set up by law enforcement as part of an undercover operation, and sold 40 hydrocodone pills to Deputy Gilmore.
- During the July 15 transaction, Jones negotiated a price for the pills and offered to obtain more for Deputy Gilmore.
- On July 18, 2011, Jones returned to the second-hand store and sold additional hydrocodone pills to Deputy Gilmore, as he had promised; this was the charged offense.
- Jones had three prior felony convictions involving the sale of drugs, with the most recent occurring in 1996.
Procedural Posture:
- The State charged Roderick Delano Jones with drug trafficking for the July 18, 2011, offense.
- At trial, Jones admitted to the July 18 sale but claimed entrapment due to Deputy Gilmore's alleged inducement in June 2011.
- To rebut Jones's entrapment claim, the State sought to admit a video recording of Jones selling hydrocodone pills to Deputy Gilmore on July 15, 2011.
- The trial court admitted the July 15, 2011, video as rebuttal evidence.
- Jones was subsequently convicted and sentenced for drug trafficking.
- Jones appealed his conviction and sentence to the Florida First District Court of Appeal, arguing the trial court erred by admitting the July 15 video.
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Issue:
Does evidence of a defendant's criminal conduct, which occurs after initial law enforcement inducement but before the charged offense and results from the same inducement, constitute admissible evidence to rebut an entrapment claim by proving the defendant’s predisposition?
Opinions:
Majority - Marstiller, J.
No, the trial court did not err by admitting evidence of Jones's July 15, 2011, drug transaction to rebut his entrapment claim and establish predisposition. The court explained that in subjective entrapment, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was predisposed to commit the criminal act prior to government inducement (Jacobson v. United States), focusing on whether the defendant was an "unwary innocent" or an "unwary criminal" who readily availed himself of the opportunity (Mathews v. United States). While Munoz v. State cautioned about using conduct resulting from inducement to establish predisposition, it did not categorically state such acts are irrelevant. Citing Kent v. State, the court reiterated that the relevance of collateral criminal activity is not based solely on when it occurred, as a subsequent offense can reveal earlier criminal intent or complete a pattern. In Jones's case, the circumstances supported admissibility: he had three prior drug sale convictions; the July 15 and July 18 transactions were highly similar in acts and location and proximate in time; and only one incident of alleged inducement (Deputy Gilmore's June conversation) occurred before Jones was prepared to sell drugs on July 15. The court found these circumstances demonstrated Jones was an "unwary criminal" who readily availed himself of the opportunity, making the July 15 transaction relevant to rebut his entrapment claim.
Analysis:
This case clarifies that evidence of a defendant's criminal acts, even if they occur after initial government inducement, can be admissible to prove predisposition in an entrapment defense. The timing of the collateral act is not the sole determinant of its relevance; rather, the court must consider the full circumstances, including the similarity, proximity, and overall pattern of activity, to determine if the defendant was genuinely predisposed. This ruling provides prosecutors with greater flexibility in rebutting entrapment claims, potentially making it more difficult for defendants with a history of similar criminal activity or those who readily engage in multiple induced acts to successfully assert the defense.
