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Jones v. Perry

District Court, E.D. Kentucky
215 F. Supp. 3d 563, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143987, 2016 WL 6090931 (2016)
ELI5:

Sections

Rule of Law:

A government policy that places a direct and substantial burden on the fundamental right to marry by absolutely prohibiting a prisoner from marrying must be subjected to strict scrutiny, requiring the policy to be supported by sufficiently important state interests and closely tailored to effectuate only those interests.


Facts:

  • Bradley Jones and Kathryn Brooke Sauer, who had known each other since middle school, rekindled a relationship while Sauer was incarcerated at the Kentucky Correctional Institution for Women (KCIW).
  • Jones visited Sauer at the prison, proposed marriage, and Sauer accepted; however, she is not eligible for parole until 2026.
  • Jones attempted to obtain a marriage license from Sue Carole Perry, the Shelby County Clerk.
  • Perry refused to issue the license because her office policy required both parties to physically appear at the clerk's office to sign the application.
  • The Warden of KCIW stated she had no objection to the marriage but refused to transport Sauer to the clerk's office solely for the purpose of obtaining a license.
  • Perry could not cite a specific statute mandating the in-person requirement but relied on a memo from the Kentucky Department for Libraries & Archives.
  • Due to Sauer's inability to travel and Perry's refusal to waive the in-person requirement, the couple was absolutely prevented from marrying.

Procedural Posture:

  • Jones filed a civil rights lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky.
  • Jones filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the clerk from enforcing the in-person requirement.
  • The District Court ordered the parties to prepare for a hearing on factual disputes.
  • The District Court held oral argument where the parties conceded there were no triable issues of fact.
  • The District Court converted the motion for a preliminary injunction into a motion for a permanent injunction.

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Issue:

Does a county clerk's policy requiring both marriage license applicants to appear in person violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause when applied to an incarcerated individual who cannot legally travel to the clerk's office?


Opinions:

Majority - Judge Gregory F. Van Tatenhove

Yes, enforcing an in-person appearance requirement that absolutely prevents a prisoner from exercising the fundamental right to marry violates the Due Process Clause. The court reasoned that the right to marry is a fundamental liberty protected by the Constitution. When a regulation imposes a 'direct and substantial burden' on this right—such as absolutely preventing a marriage rather than merely making it economically difficult—the court must apply strict scrutiny. While the clerk argued for a rational basis review citing penological interests (Toms v. Taft), the court rejected this because the clerk is not a prison administrator and cannot claim security concerns. applying strict scrutiny, the court acknowledged that verifying applicant eligibility is an important state interest. However, the in-person requirement is not 'closely tailored' to that interest because there are obvious alternatives: the clerk could drive to the prison, send a deputy, or utilize an affidavit system similar to the one established in Amos v. Higgins. Because the policy completely barred the marriage without necessary justification, it was ruled unconstitutional.



Analysis:

This decision reinforces the high level of protection afforded to the right to marry following Obergefell v. Hodges. It clarifies the distinction between 'direct and substantial' burdens (which trigger strict scrutiny) and mere economic or incidental burdens (which trigger rational basis review) within the Sixth Circuit. The court distinguished this case from Vaughn by noting that an absolute bar on marriage for prisoners is distinct from employment policies that make marriage financially burdensome. Furthermore, the opinion limits the applicability of Toms v. Taft, establishing that county clerks cannot hide behind 'penological interests' to justify restrictive policies when they are not themselves prison administrators. The ruling effectively mandates that government officials must provide reasonable accommodations (like video conferencing or affidavits) for incarcerated individuals to exercise civil rights when physical presence is impossible.

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