Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.
379 F.2d 33 (1967)
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Rule of Law:
The Civil Rights Act of 1866, codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1982, which grants all citizens the same rights to purchase property as white citizens, does not prohibit purely private racial discrimination in the sale of housing. The statute's protections are limited by the "state action" doctrine and do not apply in the absence of governmental involvement in the discrimination.
Facts:
- Joseph Lee Jones, a Black man, and his wife, Barbara Jo Jones, sought to purchase a new home in St. Louis County, Missouri.
- The Alfred H. Mayer Company was a private corporation in the business of developing subdivisions and constructing and selling homes to the public.
- The Joneses selected a home style and a specific lot in the Paddock Woods subdivision, a development being built by the Mayer Company.
- The Mayer Company and its agents refused to consider the Joneses' application to purchase a home.
- The sole reason for the refusal was that Joseph Lee Jones is Black, consistent with the company's general policy of not selling homes to Black people.
- The Paddock Woods subdivision was a private development that did not receive direct state or federal financial assistance.
Procedural Posture:
- Joseph and Barbara Jones filed a complaint against the Alfred H. Mayer Company in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri.
- The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
- The U.S. District Court granted the defendants' motion and dismissed the Joneses' complaint.
- The Joneses, as appellants, appealed the district court's dismissal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, with the Mayer Company as the appellee.
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Issue:
Does a private developer's refusal to sell a home to a person solely because of their race constitute a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1982?
Opinions:
Majority - Blackmun, Circuit Judge
No, a private developer's refusal to sell a home based on race does not violate 42 U.S.C. § 1982 because the statute requires the presence of 'state action.' Although § 1982 originated from the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which was passed under the authority of the Thirteenth Amendment and could reach private conduct, the statute was later reenacted after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. Citing Supreme Court precedent, particularly Hurd v. Hodge, the court concludes that § 1982 is now interpreted through the lens of the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits discriminatory state action, not private conduct. The court found that the alleged state involvement in this case—such as state licensing, zoning ordinances, and provision of utilities—did not rise to the level of significant state action required to invoke the statute's protections. While acknowledging recent Supreme Court cases suggesting a potential shift away from a strict state action requirement, the court stated it was bound as a lower court by existing precedent and could not expand the statute's scope.
Analysis:
This Eighth Circuit decision represents a strict adherence to the state action doctrine, significantly limiting the reach of one of the nation's oldest civil rights statutes. By concluding that § 1982 did not apply to private housing discrimination, the court left a major form of racial segregation outside the scope of federal law, placing the burden on Congress to enact new, specific fair housing legislation. The ruling exemplifies the judicial struggle between following established precedent, like Hurd v. Hodge, and reinterpreting historical statutes to address contemporary civil rights issues, a conflict that set the stage for a landmark Supreme Court reversal.
