Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc.
431 F.2d 245 (1970)
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Rule of Law:
A facially neutral employment policy that was not adopted with discriminatory intent constitutes an unlawful employment practice under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 if it perpetuates the effects of past discriminatory practices and is not justified by business necessity.
Facts:
- Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. maintained two categories of drivers: higher-paying line (over-the-road) drivers and lower-paying city drivers.
- A company policy, initiated in 1957, strictly prohibited transfers between the line and city driver categories.
- Historically, the company's hiring practices were discriminatory; all line drivers were white, while a significant portion of city drivers were Negro. At no point before the lawsuit did the company employ a Negro line driver.
- The plaintiffs, four Negro men, were all hired by Lee Way as city drivers before the effective date of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
- In 1966, the plaintiffs sought transfers to the more desirable line driver positions.
- Lee Way denied the plaintiffs' transfer requests, citing its long-standing no-transfer policy.
Procedural Posture:
- The plaintiffs, four truck drivers, sued their employer, Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma.
- The plaintiffs alleged the company's no-transfer policy violated Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
- The district court (trial court) found that the policy was based on rational considerations and ruled in favor of the defendant, Lee Way.
- The plaintiffs (appellants) appealed the district court's judgment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a company's facially neutral no-transfer policy constitute an unlawful employment practice under Title VII when it perpetuates the effects of the company's past racial discrimination in hiring and is not justified by business necessity?
Opinions:
Majority - Breitenstein, Circuit Judge
Yes, the company's no-transfer policy constitutes an unlawful employment practice. A facially neutral policy violates Title VII if it perpetuates the effects of past discrimination and is not justified by business necessity. First, the court found that statistical evidence—showing that all line drivers were white while all Negro drivers were city drivers—established a prima facie case of past discriminatory hiring practices. Second, the court reasoned that the no-transfer policy, though neutral on its face, effectively 'locks' the plaintiffs into the inferior jobs to which they were relegated because of their race, thus carrying forward the effects of the past discrimination. Finally, the court held that such a policy can only be justified by 'business necessity,' a standard more stringent than mere rationality. The company's proffered reasons—such as past difficulties with transfers, training costs, and potential union issues—were deemed insubstantial and failed to demonstrate that the policy was essential to the safe and efficient operation of the business.
Analysis:
This decision is a cornerstone in the development of the 'disparate impact' theory of discrimination under Title VII. It establishes that facially neutral employment policies can be illegal if they perpetuate the effects of past, pre-Act discrimination. The court's adoption of the stringent 'business necessity' test, rather than a mere 'rational basis' test, significantly raised the bar for employers seeking to justify policies that have discriminatory consequences. This precedent empowered employees to challenge systemic barriers to advancement, even when there is no proof of present discriminatory intent, fundamentally shaping modern employment discrimination law.
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