Jones v. Helms
1981 U.S. LEXIS 124, 452 U.S. 412, 69 L. Ed. 2d 118 (1981)
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Rule of Law:
A state does not violate the Equal Protection Clause by enhancing the punishment for a crime when the offender leaves the state after its commission, as such a law does not penalize the fundamental right to travel for an individual whose right has already been qualified by their own criminal conduct.
Facts:
- The appellee, a Georgia resident, was under a court order to pay $150 per month in child support for his minor daughter.
- Without making any payments, the appellee willfully and voluntarily abandoned his daughter, leaving her in a dependent condition.
- After abandoning his child, the appellee left Georgia and moved to Alabama to pursue vocational training.
- While in Alabama, the appellee continued to make no child support payments.
- The appellee was arrested for his failure to pay child support upon returning to Georgia for a visit with his daughter.
Procedural Posture:
- Appellee pleaded guilty to felony child abandonment in a Georgia state trial court.
- After exhausting his state remedies, appellee filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia, challenging the constitutionality of the statute.
- The U.S. District Court denied his petition for relief.
- Appellee, as appellant, appealed the denial to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's judgment, holding that the Georgia statute was unconstitutional because it infringed the fundamental right to travel.
- The Warden, as appellant, appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which granted review.
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Issue:
Does a state statute that enhances the crime of child abandonment from a misdemeanor to a felony solely because the offender leaves the state after committing the act violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by impermissibly penalizing the fundamental right to travel?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Stevens
No, the Georgia statute does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. A person who commits a crime punishable by imprisonment has a qualified, not absolute, right to travel. The appellee's own criminal misconduct—willfully abandoning his child—qualified his right to travel interstate before he sought to exercise it. Unlike prior cases involving durational residency requirements for innocent citizens, this statute enhances punishment for a sequence of events where departure aggravates the consequences of the underlying crime, making enforcement of parental support obligations more difficult. Because no fundamental right is infringed, the statute need only be rationally related to a legitimate state interest, which it is, as Georgia has a valid interest in causing parents to support their children and can rationally conclude that this purpose is served by deterring them from leaving the state.
Concurring - Justice White
Yes, the Court reaches the correct judgment. The proper approach is to first determine whether the state's interest in enforcing its child support laws is sufficient to justify whatever restriction on interstate travel the statute imposes. Here, the state's interest is sufficient. Because the restriction is justified, the equal protection claim fails, as there is a rational basis for the state's classification, and strict scrutiny is not required.
Concurring - Justice Blackmun
Yes, the judgment is correct, but the statute does penalize the right to travel. However, this penalty is justified by the State’s special and significant interest in enforcing its law in this context. The core crime, willful nonsupport, is much more difficult to redress once the parent leaves the jurisdiction. The restriction is therefore reasonably tailored to the remedial objective of the law. This reasoning might not apply to all crimes, as extradition procedures generally exist, but it is justified here because the crime is primarily concerned with restitution and support.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the scope of the fundamental right to travel by establishing that it is not absolute and can be qualified by an individual's own criminal conduct. It distinguishes between state actions that penalize innocent travel (which are subject to strict scrutiny) and those that enhance penalties for criminals whose travel complicates law enforcement (which are subject to rational basis review). The ruling gives states greater latitude to deter flight and enforce domestic obligations, like child support, by criminalizing departure in connection with an underlying offense. It sets a precedent that the act of crossing a state line can be treated as an aggravating factor for certain crimes without unconstitutionally burdening a fundamental right.
