Jones v. Flood
716 A.2d 285, 1998 Md. LEXIS 635, 351 Md. 120 (1998)
Rule of Law:
In Maryland, a personal representative in a survival action cannot recover damages for lost earnings that would have accrued after the decedent's death; recovery for lost earnings is limited to the period between the time of injury and the time of death.
Facts:
- Evelyn V. Manning was killed in a motor vehicle accident on Route 202 in Prince George’s County on December 29, 1994.
- A vehicle operated by Brian T. Flood and owned by Prince George’s County struck Manning, crushing her against her disabled vehicle, and killing her.
- Manning's immediate survivors were her four children, all of whom were over twenty-one and none of whom was dependent on her.
- Manning was unmarried at the time of her death.
- The parties stipulated that Manning suffered no conscious pain after the accident.
- The respondents admitted liability for the accident.
Procedural Posture:
- Shirley Jones, as personal representative of the estate of Evelyn V. Manning, instituted an action in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County against Brian T. Flood and Prince George’s County.
- The parties agreed that the petitioner would voluntarily dismiss a claim for punitive damages.
- The Circuit Court for Prince George’s County granted a motion for partial summary judgment in favor of the respondents on the lost earnings claim.
- The Circuit Court for Prince George’s County entered a judgment for funeral expenses after a waiver of jury trial.
- The petitioner appealed to the Court of Special Appeals.
- The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the circuit court's decision.
- The Court of Appeals of Maryland issued the writ of certiorari on the petition of the personal representative.
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Issue:
Does the personal representative of a decedent, whose death was tortiously caused, may recover damages in a survival action measured by lost earnings for the period after death to the end of the statistical life expectancy that would have been predicted for the decedent if the tort had not occurred?
Opinions:
Majority - Rodowsky, Judge
No, a personal representative of a decedent whose death was tortiously caused may not recover damages in a survival action measured by lost earnings for the period after death to the end of the statistical life expectancy that would have been predicted for the decedent if the tort had not occurred. The Court clarified that a survival action seeking damages for personal injuries to a decedent is distinct from a 'personal injury action' as contemplated in cases like Monias v. Endal, 330 Md. 274, 623 A.2d 656 (1993), which involved a living plaintiff with a shortened life expectancy. Maryland law, consistent with the majority of jurisdictions, limits damages in a survival action to losses sustained by the decedent in their lifetime, specifically between the time of injury and death, excluding damages that result to other persons from the death. Expanding recovery to include post-death lost earnings in a survival action would constitute a substantial upheaval of well-established Maryland law and judicial precedent, run contrary to long-standing policy decisions by the General Assembly concerning economic damages under the wrongful death statute (Lord Campbell’s Act), and create a high risk of duplicating damages already recoverable in a companion wrongful death case. The General Assembly's specific limitations on beneficiaries for wrongful death claims would be circumvented if post-death lost earnings were awarded to the estate via a survival action, as the estate's beneficiaries are not restricted in the same way. The Court affirmed that wrongful death damages begin with the death, while survival action damages end with the death, ensuring no overlap.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the scope of damages recoverable in Maryland's survival actions, reinforcing the traditional distinction between survival actions and wrongful death claims. It prevents potential double recovery by disallowing post-death lost earnings in survival actions, thereby upholding the General Assembly's legislative intent regarding beneficiaries and economic damages for wrongful death. The ruling also firmly delineates the application of precedent like Monias, ensuring that cases involving living plaintiffs with shortened life expectancies are not conflated with claims made on behalf of deceased individuals, providing clear guidance for future tort litigation involving fatalities.
