Jones v. Dressel

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc
623 P.2d 370 (1981)
ELI5:

Rule of Law:

An exculpatory agreement that releases a party from liability for its own simple negligence in the context of a non-essential, recreational activity is not void as a matter of public policy. A contract signed by a minor may be ratified by their actions, such as accepting the benefits of the contract, after reaching the age of majority.


Facts:

  • On November 17, 1973, William Michael Jones, then seventeen years old, signed a contract with Free Flight Sport Aviation, Inc. (Free Flight) to use its recreational skydiving facilities.
  • The contract contained a clause exempting Free Flight from liability for any injury to Jones resulting from its own negligence.
  • The contract also included an alternative provision that would have allowed Jones to use the facilities without releasing Free Flight from liability, in exchange for an increased cost.
  • On December 28, 1973, Jones attained the age of eighteen.
  • Ten months later, on October 19, 1974, Jones used Free Flight's services for a parachute jump.
  • The airplane provided by Free Flight for the jump crashed shortly after takeoff.
  • Jones suffered serious personal injuries as a result of the airplane crash.

Procedural Posture:

  • William Michael Jones filed suit against Free Flight Sport Aviation, Inc. and others in the trial court, alleging simple negligence and willful and wanton misconduct.
  • The defendants filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the simple negligence claim, arguing it was barred by the exculpatory agreement.
  • The trial court granted the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment.
  • Jones, as the appellant, appealed the trial court's decision to the Colorado Court of Appeals.
  • The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment.
  • The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.

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Issue:

Is an exculpatory agreement, which releases a provider of recreational skydiving services from liability for its own negligence, void as a matter of public policy when it was signed by a person as a minor who later ratified it by using the services after reaching the age of majority?


Opinions:

Majority - Erickson, Justice.

No. The exculpatory agreement is not void as a matter of public policy and is enforceable against Jones. The court first determined that Jones ratified the contract he signed as a minor by accepting the benefits of it—using Free Flight's facilities—ten months after reaching the age of majority. Therefore, his subsequent lawsuit did not constitute a timely disaffirmance. Second, the court held the contract was not an adhesion contract because recreational skydiving is not an essential service, there was no great disparity in bargaining power, and such services could be obtained elsewhere. Finally, applying a four-factor test, the court concluded the exculpatory agreement was valid because it did not involve a public duty, the service was recreational, the contract was fairly entered into, and the language clearly and unambiguously expressed the intent to release Free Flight from liability for its own negligence, including on its aircraft.



Analysis:

This decision establishes a key precedent in Colorado for the enforceability of exculpatory agreements in the context of recreational activities. It distinguishes non-essential services like skydiving from businesses affected with a public interest, such as common carriers or public utilities, where such waivers are typically void. The ruling solidifies a four-factor test for courts to apply when evaluating the validity of these clauses, focusing on public duty, nature of the service, fairness, and clarity. This case also reinforces the principle that a minor's contract can be ratified by conduct after reaching majority, limiting the time and means by which a once-voidable contract can be disaffirmed.

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