Jones v. Daly
1981 Cal. App. LEXIS 2043, 176 Cal. Rptr. 130, 122 Cal.App.3d 500 (1981)
Rule of Law:
A nonmarital cohabitation agreement is unenforceable if the rendition of sexual services forms an inseparable or predominant part of the consideration for the agreement, even if other non-sexual services are also included.
Facts:
- Randal Jones first met James Daly in December 1975, and between that time and March 1976, they frequently met, dated, engaged in sexual activities, and acted lovingly towards each other.
- In March 1976, Jones and Daly orally agreed that Jones would move into Daly’s condominium with Daly, quit his job, travel with Daly, and cohabit with him “as if [they] were, in fact, married.”
- They also entered into an oral agreement (the “cohabitors agreement”) whereby they agreed that during their cohabitation, they would combine their efforts and earnings, share equally any accumulated property, and Daly would give Jones a monthly allowance.
- As part of this agreement, they agreed to hold themselves out to the public as “cohabiting mates,” and Jones would render his services as a “lover, companion, homemaker, traveling companion, housekeeper and cook” to Daly.
- Jones agreed to abandon a material portion of his potential career as a model so he could devote substantial time to Daly, in return for Daly furnishing financial support to Jones for the rest of his life.
- Jones and Daly continuously cohabited and lived together from March 1976 until Daly’s death, and Jones allowed himself to be known publicly as Daly’s “lover and cohabitation mate.”
- During their cohabitation, they acquired substantial real and personal property (the “cohabitors’ equitable property”), which the agreement stipulated was to be shared equally between them.
- James Daly died in July 1978.
Procedural Posture:
- James Daly died in July 1978; defendants were appointed as executors of his estate.
- On November 1, 1978, Randal Jones filed a creditor's claim in the probate proceeding for Daly's estate, claiming one-half of the estate; defendants denied this claim.
- Jones filed a complaint against Daly's executors for declaratory and other relief, asserting seven causes of action, including for declaratory relief regarding the "cohabitors agreement," payment of his creditor's claim, a constructive trust, an implied-in-fact agreement, and common counts for the value of services.
- Defendants demurred generally to all causes of action, arguing that the agreement was unenforceable under Marvin v. Marvin because sexual services were an inseparable part of the consideration, and also specially demurred to the first cause of action on grounds of uncertainty.
- The trial court sustained the demurrer to each cause of action without leave to amend.
- Jones moved for reconsideration of the order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend, and for an order overruling the demurrer or granting leave to amend the complaint, but this motion was denied.
- Jones appealed from the judgment dismissing his action.
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Issue:
Does a nonmarital cohabitation agreement, which explicitly includes the provision of sexual services as an inseparable part of the consideration, create enforceable property or support rights between the cohabiting parties?
Opinions:
Majority - Lillie, J.
No, a nonmarital cohabitation agreement that explicitly includes the provision of sexual services as an inseparable part of the consideration does not create enforceable property or support rights. The court affirmed the trial court's dismissal, finding that the "cohabitors agreement" was unenforceable because plaintiff Randal Jones's rendition of sexual services to James Daly was an "inseparable part of the consideration" and indeed the "predominant consideration" for the agreement. Citing Marvin v. Marvin (1976), the court reiterated that while adults can contract regarding their earnings and property rights, they cannot lawfully contract to pay for sexual services, as such a contract constitutes an agreement for prostitution and is unlawful. The court interpreted the complaint's allegations—including that the parties "dated, engaged in sexual activities," agreed to "cohabit as if [they] were, in fact, married," and that Jones would render services as a "lover"—to mean that sexual services were inextricably linked to the agreement. The court also held that there was no severable portion of the contract supported by independent consideration. Furthermore, the common counts for the reasonable value of services (quantum meruit) were similarly "permeated" with the same illegal meretricious consideration, rendering them unenforceable as well, applying the rule that if recovery under specific counts is barred, common counts based on the same facts are also barred. The court found no abuse of discretion in denying leave to amend, as Jones did not demonstrate how the complaint could be cured. While technically the demurrer to the declaratory relief cause of action was improperly sustained because an actual controversy existed, reversing it would be an "idle act" since the court's opinion effectively declared the agreement unenforceable.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the application of Marvin v. Marvin by emphasizing that agreements explicitly or implicitly predicated upon the rendition of sexual services, even alongside other domestic services, will be deemed unenforceable due to illicit consideration. It underscores the judiciary's reluctance to become involved in agreements that resemble contracts for prostitution, effectively drawing a clear line where cohabitation agreements cross into illegality. Future cases will likely face a higher burden in demonstrating that nonmarital agreements are not predicated on sexual services if the language or factual circumstances suggest otherwise. This ruling serves as a cautionary tale for those entering cohabitation agreements, highlighting the importance of clear, severable terms that explicitly exclude sexual services as consideration.
