Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.

Supreme Court of the United States
392 U.S. 409, 88 S.Ct. 2186, 20 L.Ed.2d 1189 (1968)

ELI5:

Sections

Rule of Law:

The federal statute 42 U.S.C. § 1982, which guarantees all citizens the same property rights as white citizens, bars all racial discrimination, private as well as public, in the sale or rental of property. Congress holds the constitutional authority to enact such a law under the Thirteenth Amendment's Enforcement Clause to eliminate the badges and incidents of slavery.

Facts:

Alfred H. Mayer Co. was a private company developing a residential community known as Paddock Woods in St. Louis County, Missouri.
The company followed a general policy of refusing to sell homes in this community to African Americans.
Joseph Lee Jones, an African American man, and his wife, Barbara Jo Jones, sought to purchase a home in Paddock Woods.
Alfred H. Mayer Co. refused to sell a home to the Joneses.
The sole reason provided for this refusal was that Joseph Lee Jones is an African American.

Procedural Posture:

Joseph Lee Jones and Barbara Jo Jones filed a complaint against Alfred H. Mayer Co. in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, a federal trial court.
The District Court sustained the respondents' motion to dismiss the complaint, finding that § 1982 did not apply to private action.
The Joneses, as appellants, appealed the dismissal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, an intermediate appellate court.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's dismissal.
The Joneses, as petitioners, successfully petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the appellate court's decision.

Premium Content

Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief

You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture

Issue:

Does 42 U.S.C. § 1982, which guarantees all citizens the same right to purchase property as is enjoyed by white citizens, prohibit a private real estate developer from refusing to sell a home to a person solely because of their race?

Opinions:

Majority - Mr. Justice Stewart

Yes. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 bars all racial discrimination, private as well as public, in the sale or rental of property. The plain language of the statute guarantees all citizens the 'same right' to purchase property, a right that is denied when a seller refuses a transaction solely based on the buyer's race. A detailed examination of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, from which § 1982 originates, reveals that Congress intended to prohibit not only discriminatory state laws (the Black Codes) but also private, racially motivated deprivations of fundamental rights. Furthermore, Congress has the power to enact this law under Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, which grants it the authority to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing the 'badges and incidents of slavery.' The inability to acquire property on the same basis as white citizens is a relic of slavery that Congress may rationally act to eliminate.

Dissenting - Mr. Justice Harlan

No. The Court's construction of § 1982 as applying to purely private action is almost surely wrong and, at a minimum, is open to serious doubt. The Court's holding is contrary to a long line of precedent, including the Civil Rights Cases, which has consistently interpreted the statute as reaching only governmental or state action. A thorough analysis of the legislative history of the 1866 Act does not overwhelmingly support the majority's conclusion; in fact, many statements by the bill's sponsors indicate it was intended to operate only against discriminatory state laws and customs. The Court should have dismissed the writ as improvidently granted, especially since Congress recently passed the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (Fair Housing Act), which provides a more comprehensive and detailed legislative solution to housing discrimination. By interpreting the century-old statute so broadly, the Court has extended federal fair housing law far beyond what the modern Congress carefully designed.

Concurring - Mr. Justice Douglas

Yes, the statute bars private discrimination. The inability to own property was a key 'badge of slavery.' The Thirteenth Amendment was intended to do more than just formally end the institution; it empowered Congress to eliminate all its vestiges and customs. The historical and ongoing discrimination against African Americans in housing and many other areas of life demonstrates that these badges of slavery persist. Section 1982 is a direct and necessary tool, passed by the Congress of 1866, to remove these discriminatory customs and give true meaning to the freedom promised by the Thirteenth Amendment.

Analysis:

This landmark decision dramatically revived 42 U.S.C. § 1982, transforming a dormant Reconstruction-era statute into a potent tool against private racial discrimination in property transactions. By grounding its authority in the Thirteenth Amendment, the Court bypassed the 'state action' requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, establishing a direct federal prohibition on private racial bias in the sale and rental of property. This ruling created a powerful, parallel remedy to the newly enacted Fair Housing Act of 1968, significantly expanding the legal avenues available to victims of housing discrimination and affirming broad congressional power to legislate against the lingering effects of slavery.

Gunnerbot

AI-powered case assistant

Loaded: Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. (1968)

Try: "What was the holding?" or "Explain the dissent"

Case Podcast