Johnson v. Whiton
1893 Mass. LEXIS 173, 159 Mass. 424, 34 N.E. 542 (1893)
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Rule of Law:
A grantor cannot create a new kind of inheritance by limiting the descent of a fee simple estate to a specific line of heirs. Any such attempted limitation is void, and the grantee takes a fee simple absolute with full power of alienation.
Facts:
- Royal Whiton died, leaving a will.
- The will devised one-third of his estate to his granddaughter, Sarah A. Whiton, 'and her heirs on her father’s side.'
- Sarah A. Whiton and other grandchildren entered into an agreement to sell a parcel of the devised land to the plaintiff.
- The plaintiff paid a deposit for the land purchase as part of the agreement.
- The grandchildren, including Sarah A. Whiton, tendered a deed for the property to the plaintiff.
- The plaintiff refused to accept the deed, believing that the language in the will prevented Sarah A. Whiton from conveying a fee simple absolute title.
Procedural Posture:
- The prospective land buyer (plaintiff) paid a deposit under a purchase agreement.
- After refusing the tendered deed based on a title concern, the plaintiff initiated an action in a Massachusetts court to recover the deposit from the seller's representative (defendant).
- The case was presented to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts to resolve the legal question of whether the title was marketable.
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Issue:
Does a devise of land to a grantee 'and her heirs on her father's side' create a valid qualified fee that restricts the grantee's ability to convey a fee simple absolute?
Opinions:
Majority - Holmes, J.
No. A devise of land to a grantee 'and her heirs on her father's side' does not create a valid qualified fee; the limiting words are void, and the grantee takes a fee simple absolute. The court reasoned that while old English law permitted such qualified fees, its basis was the English law of descent, which traced inheritance back to the first purchaser. Massachusetts law, in contrast, does not follow this rule; its statutes of descent only consider the most recent owner, allowing property to pass between family lines. Because the legal analogy supporting such limitations in England does not exist in Massachusetts, a grantor 'cannot create a new kind of inheritance.' Furthermore, allowing such a restriction would be contrary to the strong public policy of Massachusetts favoring the free alienability of land. To prevent a cloud on title for generations, the qualifying words, 'on her father's side,' are rejected as legally void, leaving Sarah A. Whiton with a fee simple absolute that she is fully empowered to convey.
Analysis:
This decision strongly affirms the public policy favoring the free alienability of land by refusing to recognize novel estates that restrict inheritance. The court prevents 'dead hand' control, where a grantor could impose idiosyncratic limits on property descent far into the future. By invalidating the attempt to create a unique form of inheritance, the ruling simplifies land titles and promotes certainty in real estate transactions. This precedent solidifies the principle that property owners are generally limited to creating estates that are already recognized by law and cannot invent new ones with custom rules of descent.
