Johnson v. United States
135 S. Ct. 2551, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 4251, 192 L. Ed. 2d 569 (2015)
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Rule of Law:
Imposing an increased sentence under the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), which defines a violent felony as one that "otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another," violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because it is unconstitutionally vague.
Facts:
- Samuel Johnson, a felon with a long criminal record, was involved with a white-supremacist organization that the FBI suspected was planning acts of terrorism.
- During an FBI investigation, Johnson disclosed to undercover agents that he had manufactured explosives and planned to attack several targets, including "the Mexican consulate" and "progressive bookstores."
- Johnson showed the agents his AK-47 rifle, other semiautomatic firearms, and over 1,000 rounds of ammunition.
- After his arrest, Johnson pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm.
- The government sought a sentence enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA).
- The enhancement was based on Johnson's three prior convictions, one of which was for unlawful possession of a short-barreled shotgun under Minnesota law.
- The government argued that this prior conviction qualified as a "violent felony" under the ACCA's residual clause.
Procedural Posture:
- Samuel Johnson pleaded guilty in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota (a federal trial court) to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm.
- The government requested an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act, arguing that Johnson's prior conviction for unlawful possession of a short-barreled shotgun was a 'violent felony' under the Act's residual clause.
- The District Court agreed with the government and imposed the ACCA's mandatory minimum 15-year prison sentence.
- Johnson (as appellant) appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which affirmed the District Court's sentence.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted Johnson's petition for a writ of certiorari.
- After initial oral argument, the Supreme Court ordered the parties to submit new briefs and present a second oral argument on the question of whether the ACCA's residual clause is unconstitutionally vague.
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Issue:
Does the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), violate the Due Process Clause's prohibition of vague criminal laws?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Scalia
Yes. Increasing a defendant's sentence under the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act denies due process of law because the clause is unconstitutionally vague. Two features of the residual clause combine to make it unconstitutional. First, the clause creates grave uncertainty about how to estimate the risk posed by a crime because it requires judges to imagine an 'ordinary case' of a crime rather than assessing real-world facts or statutory elements. Second, the clause leaves uncertainty about how much risk is required for a crime to qualify as a 'violent felony,' forcing courts to compare the imagined 'ordinary case' to a list of enumerated crimes (burglary, arson, extortion, explosives offenses) that themselves vary widely in the degree of risk they pose. The Court's own repeated failures over nine years and four previous cases to craft a principled and objective standard from the clause confirm its hopeless indeterminacy and the arbitrariness it invites, which does not comport with the constitutional guarantee of due process.
Dissenting - Justice Alito
No. The residual clause is not unconstitutionally vague and the Court should not have invalidated it. The Court improperly brushes aside the principle of stare decisis, as it had twice rejected this same vagueness argument in the recent past in James and Sykes. A statute is only void for vagueness if it is vague in all its applications, and the majority concedes there are straightforward cases where the residual clause clearly applies, such as attempted rape or attempted arson. Furthermore, the Court could have adopted a saving interpretation by applying the clause to a defendant's 'real-world conduct' rather than insisting on the judicially-created 'categorical approach' which examines an idealized 'ordinary case.' The Court is simply expressing its weariness with ACCA cases rather than adhering to established legal principles.
Concurring - Justice Thomas
Although concurring in the judgment to reverse Johnson's sentence, he argues the case should be resolved on statutory grounds, not constitutional ones. He would hold that unlawful possession of a short-barreled shotgun does not qualify as a violent felony under the residual clause because the risk of injury is too attenuated from the criminal act of possession itself. He further expresses deep skepticism about the constitutional legitimacy of the modern void-for-vagueness doctrine, arguing its history is uncomfortably similar to that of substantive due process, a doctrine he considers to be without a basis in the Constitution.
Analysis:
This decision invalidated a key component of a major federal sentencing statute, immediately affecting thousands of sentences and prompting numerous post-conviction challenges. By striking down the residual clause, the Court significantly narrowed the scope of the Armed Career Criminal Act. The ruling signaled a heightened scrutiny for criminal statutes, particularly sentencing enhancements, that rely on abstract, risk-based standards combined with the 'categorical approach.' It created a new, influential precedent in vagueness jurisprudence by holding that the compounding of two layers of uncertainty—how to define the conduct and how to measure the risk—can render a law unconstitutional.
