Johnson v. United States
559 U.S. (2010)
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Rule of Law:
For a state battery conviction to qualify as a 'violent felony' under the Armed Career Criminal Act's force clause, the offense must have as an element the use of violent physical force—that is, force capable of causing physical pain or injury—not merely any offensive or unwanted touching.
Facts:
- Curtis Johnson had prior convictions from October 1986 for aggravated battery and burglary of a dwelling.
- In May 2003, Johnson committed an act that led to a felony conviction for battery under Florida Statute § 784.03(2).
- Florida's battery statute is disjunctive, defining battery as either "actually and intentionally touching or striking another person against the will of the other" or "intentionally causing bodily harm to another person."
- The Florida Supreme Court has interpreted the "touching" element to be satisfied by any intentional physical contact, "no matter how slight," such as a tap on the shoulder without consent.
- Following his felony battery conviction, Johnson was found to be in possession of ammunition.
Procedural Posture:
- Curtis Johnson pleaded guilty in a U.S. District Court to one count of possessing ammunition after a felony conviction.
- The Government sought an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), arguing Johnson had three prior violent felony convictions.
- Johnson objected to the classification of his 2003 Florida felony battery conviction as a 'violent felony' under the ACCA.
- The District Court overruled the objection, finding the battery conviction qualified, and imposed the 15-year mandatory minimum sentence.
- Johnson (appellant) appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which affirmed the district court's sentence.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted Johnson's petition for a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Does the Florida felony offense of battery, which includes as an element the act of intentionally touching another person, have as an element the 'use of physical force' required to be a 'violent felony' under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Scalia
No. The Florida offense of battery does not have as an element the use of 'physical force' as required by the Armed Career Criminal Act. In the context of a statute defining a 'violent felony,' the phrase 'physical force' means violent force—that is, force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person. The Court reasoned that the ordinary meaning of 'physical force,' especially when modifying 'violent felony,' connotes a substantial degree of power, not the minimal contact sufficient for common-law battery. While 'force' had a specialized meaning at common law that included any offensive touching, that meaning derived from the definition of a misdemeanor crime and does not fit the context of a federal statute defining a predicate offense for a major sentencing enhancement. Therefore, because the Florida statute allows for a conviction based on the 'least of... acts,' a mere touching, it does not categorically qualify as a violent felony under the ACCA's force clause.
Dissenting - Justice Alito
Yes. The Florida offense of battery does have as an element the use of 'physical force' under the ACCA. The phrase 'physical force' is a well-established common-law term of art that includes even the slightest offensive touching, and Congress should be presumed to have adopted that established meaning. Other clauses in the ACCA and related statutes explicitly require a 'risk of physical injury' or force 'expected to cause bodily injury,' and the absence of such language in the clause at issue implies that no such level of violence is required. Furthermore, the ACCA includes crimes like burglary and extortion as 'violent felonies' even though they can be committed without violence, demonstrating that the statute uses 'violent felony' as a term of art that is broader than its ordinary meaning and includes offenses that create a risk of confrontation.
Analysis:
This decision significantly narrows the scope of the ACCA's force clause by defining 'physical force' as 'violent force.' It rejects the government's attempt to equate the term with the broader common-law definition of force used in battery. This ruling requires federal courts to look more closely at state statutes, and where a statute is broad enough to cover non-violent touching, prosecutors must use the 'modified categorical approach' to prove a defendant was convicted under a violent prong of the statute. This increases the evidentiary burden on the government and may prevent the application of the ACCA enhancement in cases where state criminal records are ambiguous or incomplete.
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