Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, California, et al.
480 U.S. 616 (1987)
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Rule of Law:
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not prohibit a public employer from taking sex into account as one factor in a promotion decision under a voluntary affirmative action plan, provided the plan is designed to remedy a manifest imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories, does not unnecessarily trammel the rights of male employees, and is a temporary measure intended to attain, not maintain, a balanced workforce.
Facts:
- In 1978, the Transportation Agency of Santa Clara County adopted an Affirmative Action Plan to remedy the underrepresentation of women and minorities.
- The Plan noted that while women made up 36.4% of the local labor force, they constituted only 22.4% of Agency employees and were concentrated in clerical positions.
- Crucially, none of the 238 positions in the Skilled Craft Worker job category, which was traditionally segregated, were held by a woman.
- In 1979, a road dispatcher position, classified as a Skilled Craft job, became available.
- Paul Johnson and Diane Joyce, both county employees, applied and were among seven candidates deemed qualified.
- In a preliminary interview, Johnson scored 75 and Joyce scored 73.
- A second interview panel recommended Johnson for the promotion.
- The Agency Director, James Graebner, considering the candidates' qualifications, backgrounds, interview scores, and the goals of the Affirmative Action Plan, ultimately promoted Joyce.
Procedural Posture:
- Paul Johnson filed a sex discrimination complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and subsequently received a right-to-sue letter.
- Johnson sued the Transportation Agency in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging a violation of Title VII.
- The District Court (trial court) ruled in favor of Johnson, finding the Agency's plan was invalid because it was not temporary.
- The Transportation Agency, as appellant, appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
- The Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court, holding that the Agency's consideration of Joyce's sex was lawful and the plan was valid.
- Johnson, as petitioner, successfully petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Does a public employer's voluntary affirmative action plan, which considers sex as one factor in promoting a qualified female employee over a slightly higher-scoring male employee into a traditionally segregated job category where women are manifestly underrepresented, violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Brennan
No, the Agency's plan does not violate Title VII. A voluntary affirmative action plan is permissible under Title VII if it satisfies a two-part test derived from Steelworkers v. Weber. First, the plan must be justified by a 'manifest imbalance' that reflects the underrepresentation of women in 'traditionally segregated job categories.' Here, the fact that none of the 238 Skilled Craft positions were held by women established a manifest imbalance. Second, the plan must not unnecessarily trammel the rights of male employees or create an absolute bar to their advancement. The Agency's plan satisfied this because it set no quotas, did not require the discharge of male employees, and authorized that sex be considered as only one 'plus' factor among many in evaluating qualified candidates. Furthermore, the plan was a temporary measure designed to attain, not maintain, a permanent sexual balance in the workforce.
Concurring - Justice Stevens
No, the plan is permissible. While the original intent of Title VII was a blanket prohibition on all discrimination, the Court's subsequent decisions in Bakke and Weber have become established precedent that must be followed. Under the principle of stare decisis, these cases permit voluntary affirmative action plans. The antidiscrimination statute should be construed as a 'shield,' allowing employers to voluntarily and lawfully grant a preference to a member of a disadvantaged group to create diversity and remedy the effects of past societal exclusion, which is what the Agency did here.
Concurring - Justice O'Connor
No, the plan is permissible in this instance, but the majority's standard is too vague. The proper standard for a public employer's affirmative action plan under Title VII should be the same as under the Equal Protection Clause: the employer must have a 'firm basis' for believing that remedial action is required. This firm basis exists if there is a statistical disparity sufficient to support a prima facie case of past discrimination. In this case, the 'inexorable zero'—the fact that there were no women in 238 skilled craft jobs—provided that firm basis. Because the plan was narrowly tailored and used sex as only a 'plus' factor rather than a quota, its application here was valid.
Dissenting - Justice White
Yes, the plan violates Title VII. The majority misinterprets Weber, which should only apply to plans designed to remedy an employer's own intentional and systematic exclusion, not just a 'manifest imbalance' in the workforce. This interpretation is a 'perversion of Title VII,' and Weber should be overruled.
Dissenting - Justice Scalia
Yes, the plan clearly violates Title VII. The plain language of the statute forbids discrimination 'because of...sex,' and that is precisely what the Agency did. The plan was not designed to remedy past discrimination by the Agency—the trial court found none—but to achieve a workforce that mirrored the county's general population, which is impermissible social engineering. The Court's decision converts a statute designed to guarantee a discrimination-free workplace into one that effectively compels employers to engage in race- and sex-based discrimination to avoid disparate impact lawsuits.
Analysis:
This landmark decision extends the framework of Steelworkers v. Weber, which permitted private employers to implement race-conscious affirmative action plans, to public employers and sex-based preferences. The Court solidified the 'manifest imbalance' standard, clarifying that an employer need not admit to or prove its own past discrimination to justify a remedial plan. This ruling provides public employers with significant latitude to implement flexible, goal-oriented affirmative action programs, so long as they avoid rigid quotas and consider protected characteristics as a 'plus' factor among other qualifications. The case remains a cornerstone of affirmative action jurisprudence under Title VII.
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