Johnson v. State
579 P.2d 20, 1978 Alas. LEXIS 664 (1978)
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Rule of Law:
A statement is admissible as a dying declaration if the declarant makes it while believing their death is imminent, which is determined by the totality of the circumstances; the declarant does not need to have abandoned all hope of recovery. Additionally, statements identifying an assailant are not admissible under the hearsay exception for statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment, as they are not pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.
Facts:
- On December 30, 1975, Elizabeth Johnson was hospitalized with severe injuries from a beating.
- At the hospital, Mrs. Johnson first told a nurse, Vera Marvin, that another man had beaten her, but then admitted her husband, Elliott P. Johnson, was the assailant.
- On January 2, 1976, Mrs. Johnson's condition worsened, requiring surgery. Her doctor, Dr. Longenbaugh, informed her that her condition was very serious and she might not survive.
- Following the surgery, both Dr. Longenbaugh and another physician, Dr. Silver, informed Mrs. Johnson that she was gravely ill and her chances of survival were not good.
- On January 5, 1976, three days after the surgery, Mrs. Johnson informed Sgt. Edgar Thornton that she had consulted a priest.
- In a recorded interview with Sgt. Thornton on January 5, Mrs. Johnson stated that her husband, Elliott Johnson, had beaten her following a dispute over money.
Procedural Posture:
- The State brought criminal charges against Elliott P. Johnson in the superior court.
- Prior to trial, Johnson filed a motion to suppress four statements made by the victim, Elizabeth Johnson.
- The superior court, acting as the trial court, denied the motion for the first two statements (to medical staff) but granted the motion for the last two statements (to police).
- Johnson, the defendant, petitioned the Alaska Supreme Court for review of the part of the order denying his motion.
- The State, the cross-petitioner, sought review of the part of the order granting Johnson's motion.
- The Alaska Supreme Court granted review to both parties.
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Issue:
Is a victim's statement admissible as a dying declaration if the victim believes death is imminent, even if they have not abandoned all hope of recovery?
Opinions:
Majority - Matthews, Justice
Yes, a victim's statement is admissible as a dying declaration if made under a belief of imminent death, without requiring the abandonment of all hope. The court rejected the stricter, traditional standard requiring the declarant to have abandoned all hope of recovery as 'overly demanding' in light of modern medical practices. The proper standard is whether the declarant possesses 'such a belief that he is facing death as to remove ordinary worldly motives for misstatement.' Considering the totality of the circumstances—including that two doctors had advised Mrs. Johnson of the gravity of her condition, she was conscious and alert, and she had consulted a priest—her January 5 statement was made with an awareness of impending death and is therefore admissible. However, her initial statements to medical personnel identifying her husband were not admissible under the medical diagnosis exception because statements of fault or identity are not reasonably pertinent to treatment.
Dissenting - Boochever, Chief Justice
No, the appellate court should not definitively rule the statement admissible but should remand for the trial court to apply the new standard. While agreeing that the correct standard is 'awareness of impending death' rather than 'abandonment of all hope,' the dissent argues that the determination is a finding of fact for the trial judge. The trial judge's findings should not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Since the trial judge applied the incorrect legal standard, the proper remedy is to remand the case for the judge to reconsider the evidence—which includes countervailing factors like the doctors giving her some hope and the key statements being elicited by leading questions—under the newly clarified correct standard.
Concurring - Connor, Justice
Yes, the statement was admissible, but the court did not need to discard the traditional 'abandoned hope' standard to reach this conclusion. The concurrence argues that the circumstances of this case were so severe that one could infer Mrs. Johnson had, in fact, abandoned all hope and spoke 'with the consciousness of a swift and certain doom.' While agreeing with the outcome, this opinion expresses concern about relaxing the traditional rule, noting that its strict limitations reflect an 'accumulated wisdom about the dangers of admitting dying declarations too readily.' The existing common law criteria should be adhered to until a new rule is established through positive enactment.
Analysis:
This decision significantly modernizes the dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule in Alaska, replacing the rigid 'abandonment of all hope' requirement with a more flexible 'awareness of impending death' standard. This change makes it easier to admit victims' statements in homicide prosecutions, reflecting the reality that medical professionals often preserve a sliver of hope for critically ill patients. The ruling also clarifies the scope of the medical diagnosis exception, strictly limiting it to information pertinent to treatment and excluding statements that merely assign fault. This reinforces a clear boundary between medical necessity and legal culpability in evidence law.
