Johnson v. Spencer
Filed February 13, 2020 (2020)
Rule of Law:
A civil rights claim dismissed as frivolous under the former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) is not a judgment 'on the merits' for claim preclusion purposes and therefore does not bar a subsequent paid complaint making the same allegations; however, a prior judgment following a bench trial where procedural challenges were waived on appeal generally holds preclusive effect, even if the underlying conviction is later overturned. Courts have broad discretion under Rule 60(b)(6) to grant relief from final judgments for 'any other reason that justifies relief,' and this power is not limited by an erroneous law-equity distinction or by the mere act of having filed the original lawsuit.
Facts:
- In June 1989, Andrew Johnson returned to an acquaintance's apartment in Cheyenne after meeting her at a bar, where they drank and smoked marijuana.
- Johnson left his driver's license and picture I.D., which he had used to prepare marijuana, on the coffee table in the acquaintance's living room.
- Later that night, the acquaintance's downstairs neighbor heard aggressive knocking, glass shattering, and a woman screaming “No, no!” from the upstairs apartment, prompting the neighbor to call the police.
- Officer Spencer and Officer Raybuck arrived to find the acquaintance whimpering hysterically with her hair mussed and robe half undone, repeatedly stating, “He hurt me.”
- Officer Spencer allegedly took Johnson's IDs from the coffee table and showed them to the acquaintance, leading her to identify Johnson as the assailant.
- Detective Stanford investigated, taking biological samples from Johnson and interviewing the acquaintance, who later claimed she found Johnson's eyeglasses in her bedroom, which Johnson alleges were “planted.”
- A jury convicted Johnson of aggravated burglary and first-degree sexual assault, based on the acquaintance's testimony, the found IDs and eyeglasses, and forensic testimony placing Johnson among 5% who could have left seminal fluid.
- In August 2013, after serving 24 years, a Wyoming court declared Johnson actually innocent when improved DNA testing revealed the seminal fluid matched the acquaintance's then-boyfriend, not Johnson.
Procedural Posture:
- While incarcerated, Andrew Johnson filed an in forma pauperis federal civil-rights action in 1991 against the City of Cheyenne and Detective Stanford, among other parties, in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming.
- Johnson amended his complaint, requesting a jury trial, which the district court denied and overruled his objection.
- The district court transferred the case to another judge, who referred it to a magistrate judge for a new evidentiary hearing.
- The magistrate judge conducted a bench trial, issued Findings of Fact and Recommendations advising that Johnson’s complaint be denied with prejudice.
- The district court overruled Johnson’s objections and adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendations, dismissing his claims with prejudice.
- Johnson appealed to the Tenth Circuit, which affirmed the district court’s judgment, noting that Johnson had not raised any objection to the procedure followed (bench trial without a jury) on appeal.
- While the 1991 Action was pending, Johnson filed another federal civil-rights action in 1992, a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit, against Officer Spencer in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming, alleging due-process violations.
- Before Officer Spencer filed a response, the district court sua sponte dismissed Johnson’s complaint with prejudice as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1993).
- Johnson appealed to the Tenth Circuit (appellant), which affirmed the dismissal, stating the action was dismissed as factually frivolous under § 1915(d) and based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.
- After his exoneration in 2013, Johnson filed a third federal civil-rights action in 2017 against Cheyenne, the Estate of Detective Stanford, and Officer Spencer in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming.
- Cheyenne and Officer Spencer separately moved to dismiss the 2017 Action, arguing claim preclusion; the Estate later filed its own motion to dismiss on the same grounds.
- The district court granted all three motions to dismiss, finding Johnson’s claims were barred by claim preclusion.
- Johnson filed identical motions in the dockets for his 1991, 1992, and 2017 Actions to set aside the judgments under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), and also filed a Rule 59 motion to alter or amend the judgment in the 2017 Action.
- The district court denied all of Johnson's post-judgment motions, rejecting his arguments that the prior judgments were void or should be set aside, and his additional arguments against the application of claim preclusion.
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Issue:
Does a prior federal civil rights judgment, dismissed as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) or affirmed on direct appeal after a bench trial despite a jury demand, have claim-preclusive effect on a subsequent 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action filed after the plaintiff's underlying criminal conviction is overturned due to actual innocence, and does actual innocence justify Rule 60(b)(6) relief from those prior judgments if the district court applied an erroneous legal framework?
Opinions:
Majority - Holmes, Circuit Judge
No, a civil rights judgment dismissed as frivolous under the former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) does not have claim-preclusive effect on a subsequent Section 1983 action, but a judgment from a bench trial where the plaintiff waived procedural challenges on appeal does; and actual innocence can be an extraordinary circumstance justifying Rule 60(b)(6) relief from prior judgments, but the district court must exercise its discretion under the correct legal rubric. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Johnson's Rule 60(b)(4) motions, holding that Heck v. Humphrey (decided in 1994) does not retroactively void the final 1991 judgment, and that even if it applied to the 1992 judgment, any jurisdictional error would not be the kind that renders a judgment void under Rule 60(b)(4). Johnson also waived his due process argument concerning the 1991 Action by failing to raise it on direct appeal. However, the court vacated the district court’s denial of Johnson's Rule 60(b)(6) motions, finding two legal errors: 1) the district court incorrectly believed Rule 60(b)(6) relief was limited to 'equitable' proceedings, when in fact it applies to all civil actions, and 2) the district court erred by concluding that simply filing a lawsuit constitutes a 'free, calculated, and deliberate choice' precluding Rule 60(b)(6) relief, as this concept applies to decisions like settlement or not appealing, not the act of initiating litigation. The court remanded for reconsideration of Rule 60(b)(6) relief under the correct legal standards, without expressing a view on the ultimate outcome. Regarding the claim preclusion defense, the court affirmed the dismissal of claims against Cheyenne and the Estate of Stanford. It reasoned that the 1991 Action was a final judgment 'on the merits' where Johnson had a 'full and fair opportunity to litigate' his claims, including the procedural issue of the bench trial versus jury trial, which he litigated before the district court and could have challenged on appeal but waived. The court rejected Johnson's argument that Heck v. Humphrey prevented accrual of his claims, reaffirming that a new legal rule does not reopen final judgments. The court also found no reversible error in the district court ruling on the Estate's motion before Johnson's response period elapsed, given the identical claim preclusion analysis to Cheyenne and the futility of amendment. Conversely, the court reversed the dismissal of claims against Officer Spencer. It held that the 1992 Action did not result in a judgment 'on the merits' because it was expressly dismissed as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1993). Citing Denton v. Hernandez, the court clarified that a § 1915(d) dismissal, whether for factual or legal frivolousness, is an exercise of in forma pauperis discretion and does not prejudice the filing of a paid complaint making the same allegations. The district court's brief discussion of harmlessness did not transform the dismissal into a merits adjudication. Finally, the court found Johnson failed to properly move for leave to amend his complaint, as merely suggesting amendment in a brief is insufficient. The court granted the amicus brief but denied as moot Johnson's motion to supplement the record, as the district court had already allowed the inclusion of the materials.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the nuances of claim preclusion and Rule 60(b) relief in the Tenth Circuit, especially for plaintiffs later exonerated. It provides crucial guidance that dismissals for frivolousness under former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) are not 'on the merits' and thus do not bar subsequent litigation on the same claims via a paid complaint. The ruling reinforces the extraordinary yet broad equitable power of Rule 60(b)(6) to address manifest injustice like actual innocence, particularly when lower courts base denials on misinterpretations of the Rule's scope. This decision offers a pathway for individuals seeking justice after wrongful convictions, preventing premature or procedural dismissals from acting as an insurmountable barrier.
