Johnson v. Riverdale Anesthesia Associates
275 Ga. 240, 563 S.E.2d 431 (2002)
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Rule of Law:
In a medical malpractice action, evidence of how a testifying medical expert personally would have treated the patient is irrelevant to both the establishment of the standard of care and for the purpose of impeaching the expert's credibility.
Facts:
- Clair Johnson was scheduled for surgery and was placed under the care of an anesthesiologist, Dr. Lawhead, of Riverdale Anesthesia Associates.
- Dr. Lawhead did not perform a 'pre-oxygenation' procedure on Mrs. Johnson before administering anesthesia.
- During the surgery, Mrs. Johnson experienced a severe adverse reaction to the anesthesia, which caused an interruption to her oxygen supply.
- As a result of the oxygen deprivation, Mrs. Johnson suffered massive brain trauma and died.
- Her husband, Donald Johnson, alleged that the failure to pre-oxygenate was a breach of the standard of care.
Procedural Posture:
- Donald Johnson and the administratrix of Clair Johnson's estate sued Dr. Lawhead and Riverdale Anesthesia Associates for medical malpractice in the trial court.
- The defendants filed a motion in limine to prevent Johnson from cross-examining their expert witness, Dr. Caplan, about his personal medical practices.
- The trial court granted the defendants' motion in limine.
- Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants.
- Johnson, as the appellant, appealed the trial court's ruling to the Georgia Court of Appeals, an intermediate appellate court.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
- The Supreme Court of Georgia, the state's highest court, granted Johnson's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision.
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Issue:
In a medical malpractice action, is evidence of what a defendant's expert witness personally would have done in the same situation admissible to establish the standard of care or to impeach the expert's credibility?
Opinions:
Majority - Sears, Presiding Justice
No. In a medical malpractice action, evidence of an expert witness's personal practices is not admissible to establish the standard of care or for impeachment. The controlling standard of care is that which is ordinarily employed by the medical profession generally, not what one individual physician would do under similar circumstances. Therefore, questioning an expert about their personal treatment preferences is irrelevant to whether the defendant breached the general professional standard. Because such information is irrelevant to the issues in controversy, it cannot be used to impeach the expert's credibility, as a witness may not be impeached with irrelevant facts.
Dissenting - Carley, Justice
Yes. While an expert's personal practices cannot establish the standard of care, such evidence should be admissible for the purpose of impeaching the expert's credibility. The right to a thorough and sifting cross-examination is a fundamental component of the legal process. If a defense expert testifies that a defendant's conduct met the standard of care, but concedes on cross-examination that they personally would not have acted in the same manner, that concession severely shakes the expert's credibility. Denying this line of questioning materially abridges the plaintiff's right to test the veracity and accuracy of the witness's testimony.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the objective nature of the medical standard of care in Georgia, focusing the legal inquiry on the collective practice of the profession rather than the subjective preferences of individual practitioners. By declaring an expert's personal practices irrelevant for both substantive and impeachment purposes, the court significantly narrows the scope of permissible cross-examination for plaintiffs. This precedent makes it more difficult to challenge a defense expert's credibility and reinforces that a mere difference of opinion among doctors does not constitute malpractice, so long as both opinions fall within the accepted professional standard.
