Johnson v. Paynesville Farmers Union Cooperative Oil Co.
817 N.W.2d 693 (2012)
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Rule of Law:
In Minnesota, an invasion of land by intangible particulate matter, such as chemical pesticide drift, does not constitute a trespass, which requires a tangible invasion interfering with the right of exclusive possession; rather, such an invasion is properly addressed through a claim of nuisance, which protects the right to use and enjoyment of property. Furthermore, the federal organic regulation prohibiting substances from being "applied to" land (7 C.F.R. § 205.202(b)) refers to intentional application by the organic producer, not unintentional drift from a third party.
Facts:
- Oluf and Debra Johnson (“Johnsons”) operated a certified organic farm in central Minnesota.
- Paynesville Farmers Union Cooperative Oil Company (“Cooperative”) provided pesticide application services to conventional farms.
- On June 15, 2007, the Cooperative sprayed pesticides on a conventional farm adjacent to the Johnsons' transitional soybean field while winds were blowing towards the Johnsons' property.
- The pesticide spray drifted onto the Johnsons' field, contaminating it with chemicals including dicamba.
- The Minnesota Department of Agriculture (MDA) investigated and required the Johnsons to plow down approximately 10 acres of their soybeans due to the contamination and observed visual damage.
- The Johnsons' organic certifying agent, OCIA, informed them that due to the contamination, they would have to restart the 3-year transition period for the land to become certified organic.
- Based on this information, the Johnsons took the affected field out of organic production for three years, resulting in economic loss.
- In 2008, two more incidents of pesticide drift from the Cooperative's spraying contaminated the Johnsons' transitional alfalfa field, leading them to also take that field out of organic production for three years.
Procedural Posture:
- The Johnsons sued the Cooperative in Minnesota district court (trial court), alleging trespass, nuisance, and negligence per se.
- The district court granted the Cooperative's motion for summary judgment, dismissing all of the Johnsons' claims.
- The Johnsons, as appellants, appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals; the Cooperative was the appellee.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment, reinstating the Johnsons' claims.
- The Cooperative, as appellant, petitioned for review to the Minnesota Supreme Court, which was granted; the Johnsons are the respondents.
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Issue:
Does the unintentional drift of chemical pesticide particles onto another's land constitute an actionable trespass under Minnesota law?
Opinions:
Majority - Gildea, Chief Justice
No, the unintentional drift of chemical pesticide particles does not constitute an actionable trespass. Trespass protects the right to exclusive possession from tangible invasions, whereas nuisance protects the right to use and enjoyment from intangible interferences. The court reasoned that trespass in Minnesota requires a wrongful and unlawful entry by a physical, tangible agency. Intangible invasions, like pesticide drift, odors, or noise, interfere with a landowner's use and enjoyment of their property, not their exclusive possession, and are therefore the subject of nuisance law. The court declined to adopt the modern view from other jurisdictions that allows trespass for particulate matter, arguing that it improperly blurs the distinction between trespass and nuisance by adding elements like 'substantial damages,' which are foreign to Minnesota's traditional trespass doctrine. Furthermore, the court held that the federal regulation requiring organic land to have 'had no prohibited substances... applied to it' (7 C.F.R. § 205.202(b)) unambiguously refers to intentional application by the organic producer, not unintentional drift from a third party. Therefore, any damages the Johnsons suffered from decertification were caused by their certifying agent's erroneous interpretation of the law, not proximately by the Cooperative's actions. However, the Johnsons' other nuisance and negligence claims for damages like destroyed crops and health effects were remanded for further consideration.
Dissenting - Page, Justice
Yes, the unintentional drift of chemical pesticide particles could constitute an actionable trespass. The majority's categorical rule that particulate matter can never be a trespass is too broad and relies on an outdated distinction between tangible and intangible objects. The proper distinction between trespass and nuisance should be based on the nature of the property interest affected—trespass protects exclusive possession, while nuisance protects use and enjoyment. When a harmful substance like a pesticide settles on land and causes damage, it can interfere with the owner's possessory interest, thus constituting a trespass. The dissent also disagreed with the majority's interpretation of 7 C.F.R. § 205.202(b), arguing that the regulation's passive language ('applied to it') focuses on the condition of the land, not on who applied the substance. Therefore, any application, including drift, should trigger the regulation's three-year transition period.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the traditional, strict distinction between the torts of trespass and nuisance in Minnesota, rejecting a modern trend to merge them for invasions by microscopic particles. By confining trespass to tangible invasions of possessory rights, the court ensures that claims involving pollution, odors, and chemical drift are litigated under nuisance or negligence theories, which require a balancing of interests and proof of damages. This raises the bar for plaintiffs like organic farmers seeking to hold neighbors strictly liable for contamination, as nuisance claims are often more difficult to prove than trespass claims. The court's narrow interpretation of federal organic regulations also places a significant burden on organic farmers and their certifying agents to correctly apply rules regarding third-party contamination.
