Johnson v. Levy
43 So. 46, 118 La. 447, 1907 La. LEXIS 741 (1907)
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Rule of Law:
An action for damages for breach of a promise to marry is heritable and may be brought against the promisor's heirs if the promisor was put in default prior to death. The act of putting the promisor in default transforms the personal obligation to marry into a heritable obligation to pay compensatory damages.
Facts:
- In 1901, Plaintiff became engaged to be married to Lazare Levy.
- During the engagement, Levy seduced Plaintiff and she became pregnant with his child.
- Levy repeatedly promised to fulfill his engagement to marry Plaintiff but failed to do so.
- On June 29, 1903, Plaintiff made a formal demand upon Levy to fulfill his promise of marriage, thereby putting him in default.
- Levy refused to comply with the demand.
- Later on that same day, June 29, 1903, Lazare Levy died.
- After Levy's death, Plaintiff gave birth to their child.
- Levy's siblings, the defendants, accepted his succession unconditionally.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiff sued the heirs of Lazare Levy in the district court for damages for breach of a promise to marry.
- Defendants filed an exception of no cause of action, which the trial court overruled.
- At trial, before a jury, defendants objected to the introduction of any evidence by the plaintiff.
- The trial court sustained the defendants' objection, excluding all of plaintiff's evidence.
- Finding it impossible to proceed, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff's demand as in case of non-suit.
- Plaintiff, as appellant, appealed the judgment of dismissal to this court.
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Issue:
Does an action for damages for breach of a promise to marry, where the promisor was formally put in default before his death, survive against his heirs?
Opinions:
Majority - Monroe, J.
Yes, the action for damages survives against the heirs. While a marriage engagement is a personal obligation that is not normally heritable, the nature of the obligation changes once the promisor is put in default. The court reasoned that the act of putting Levy in default, followed by his refusal, forfeited his right to perform the marriage. This legal step resolved the personal obligation to marry into a heritable obligation to pay money damages. The obligation to respond in damages, previously incidental, became the sole obligation of the contract. The court further held that damages for injured feelings, disgrace, and social ostracism are considered actual, compensatory damages under Louisiana law, not punitive damages. Because the liability for these compensatory damages was fixed upon Levy before his death, the action to recover them can be maintained against his heirs who accepted his succession.
Analysis:
This decision establishes a critical distinction in Louisiana contract law regarding the heritability of personal obligations. It carves out an exception to the general rule that personal actions die with the obligor by focusing on the civil law concept of 'putting in default.' By holding that this formal demand transforms a personal obligation (marriage) into a monetary one (damages), the court created a pathway for recovery against an estate that would otherwise be barred. The case also clarifies that damages for emotional harm are compensatory, not punitive, and therefore can be sought from a deceased's heirs, solidifying their status as actual damages recoverable from a succession.
