Johnson v. General Motors Corp.
598 F.2d 432 (1979)
Rule of Law:
Due process requires that notice be provided to absent class members in a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) class action before their individual claims for monetary damages can be barred by the doctrine of res judicata, even though Rule 23 itself does not mandate notice in such actions.
Facts:
- Herman Johnson, a black employee at a General Motors (GM) plant, was promoted from an hourly to a salaried position in 1971.
- In 1972, following a supervisor's criticism, Johnson was demoted back to an hourly-wage position.
- Johnson filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in 1973 for racial discrimination.
- Subsequent to his EEOC filing, Johnson was again promoted to a salaried position.
- A prior class action lawsuit, Rowe v. General Motors Corp., had been litigated by other black hourly-paid employees at the same plant, challenging racially discriminatory promotion procedures.
- Johnson was an employee at the plant during the Rowe litigation and thus a member of the plaintiff class.
- No notice of the Rowe litigation was provided to any of the absent class members, including Johnson.
Procedural Posture:
- In a prior case, Rowe v. General Motors Corp., black employees filed a class action suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.
- The district court in Rowe found for General Motors, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding the promotion practices discriminatory.
- On remand, the district court in Rowe entered an injunction against General Motors, and the named plaintiffs settled their individual monetary claims.
- Herman Johnson later filed a new class action against General Motors in federal district court, seeking both injunctive and monetary relief for racial discrimination.
- The district court dismissed Johnson's suit, holding it was barred by the res judicata effect of the prior Rowe judgment.
- Johnson, as appellant, appealed the dismissal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
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Issue:
Does the doctrine of res judicata bar a subsequent suit for individual monetary damages brought by an absent class member of a prior Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) class action in which no notice was provided to absent class members?
Opinions:
Majority - Charles Clark
No. The doctrine of res judicata does not bar the monetary claims of an absent class member who did not receive notice of a prior Rule 23(b)(2) class action. While Rule 23 does not mandate notice for (b)(2) actions, which primarily seek injunctive or declaratory relief, due process requires notice before the individual monetary claims of absent class members may be extinguished. The court reasoned that when a class action seeks only equitable relief for a cohesive group, adequate representation may satisfy due process. However, when individual monetary claims are at stake, the constitutional guarantee of an opportunity to be heard requires some form of notice. Therefore, while Johnson is bound by the injunctive relief granted in the prior 'Rowe' suit and cannot seek duplicative remedies, his personal claim for monetary damages is not barred for lack of notice.
Concurring - Fay
I concur in the judgment that Johnson's monetary claims are not barred. The majority's scholarly opinion is correct, but this entire issue highlights the problems created when courts fail to strictly follow the procedures of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. If not for binding precedent, I would hold that the prior 'Rowe' case was never a valid class action because it was never formally certified as such by the trial court. The failure to adhere to the explicit requirements of Rule 23, such as certification and notice, leads to complex remedial issues like the one before this court, and this case should serve as a 'cautionary signal' to trial courts.
Analysis:
This decision establishes a critical due process limitation on the preclusive effect of Rule 23(b)(2) class action judgments. It creates a distinction between the binding effect of such judgments on claims for equitable relief versus claims for individual monetary damages. By requiring notice before precluding monetary claims, the court ensures that the constitutional rights of absent class members are protected, preventing their damage claims from being extinguished without their knowledge. This precedent effectively mandates a hybrid approach for (b)(2) actions involving monetary relief, forcing courts to provide some form of notice to bind the entire class on all claims.
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