Johnson v. . City of New York
78 N.E. 715, 186 N.Y. 139, 1906 N.Y. LEXIS 1096 (1906)
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Rule of Law:
A voluntary spectator at an illegal event conducted on a public highway cannot recover for injuries based solely on the event's illegality, but must instead prove that the injuries were caused by the organizers' negligence.
Facts:
- The Automobile Club of America received permission from the New York City Board of Aldermen to conduct high-speed automobile trials on the Southside Boulevard, a public highway.
- The resolution purported to suspend the city's eight-mile-per-hour speed limit for the event.
- The plaintiff, Johnson, traveled approximately five miles from her home for the express purpose of watching the race.
- After initially watching from the highway, Johnson moved into an adjacent clump of woods to get a better view.
- During the race, an automobile traveling at about sixty miles per hour was deflected from the road.
- The vehicle entered the woods where Johnson was standing and struck her, causing injuries.
Procedural Posture:
- Johnson sued the City of New York and the Automobile Club of America in the trial court.
- The trial court directed a verdict for Johnson, ruling that the race was an unlawful nuisance as a matter of law.
- The trial court submitted only the question of damages to the jury, which returned a verdict for Johnson.
- The defendants appealed the judgment to the Appellate Division.
- The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's judgment.
- The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals of New York, the state's highest court.
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Issue:
Does the mere illegality of an automobile race held on a public highway render the organizers strictly liable for injuries sustained by a voluntary spectator, regardless of any specific negligence in the race's operation?
Opinions:
Majority - Cullen, Ch. J.
No. The illegality of holding a race on a public highway does not, by itself, make the organizers liable for injuries to a voluntary spectator; liability must be based on a finding of negligence. The court reasoned that while the race was an illegal obstruction of the highway and a public nuisance, this illegality constituted a wrong against the public and ordinary travelers, not against a spectator like the plaintiff who attended voluntarily to enjoy the event. The plaintiff is chargeable with knowledge of the law, and the danger she faced would have been the same whether the event was legal or not. The court applied the principle that a person cannot complain about an act in which they participated for their own enjoyment. Therefore, the plaintiff's right to recover depends not on the illegality of the contest, but on whether her injury was caused by the defendants' negligence in conducting the race, which is a question of fact for a jury to decide.
Analysis:
This decision establishes a crucial distinction between the duty owed to the general public and the duty owed to voluntary spectators of an illegal, dangerous activity. By rejecting a theory of nuisance per se or strict liability for spectators, the court effectively introduces an assumption of risk-like concept. It prevents a plaintiff from using the illegality of an event they willingly attended as the basis for liability. This precedent forces future plaintiffs in similar situations to proceed under a standard negligence theory, requiring them to prove a breach of a duty of care, causation, and damages, and also opening them up to defenses like contributory negligence.
