Johnson v. City of Cincinnati
310 F.3d 484 (6th Cir. 2002) (2002)
Rule of Law:
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a fundamental right to intrastate travel (localized travel on public roadways) and freedom of association; therefore, municipal ordinances significantly restricting access to public neighborhoods are subject to strict scrutiny.
Facts:
- The City of Cincinnati enacted an ordinance creating 'drug exclusion zones' in high-crime neighborhoods, specifically the Over-the-Rhine district, to combat drug abuse.
- Under this ordinance, individuals arrested for drug offenses in the zone were banned from entering the area for 90 days, and those convicted were banned for one year.
- Patricia Johnson was arrested for a marijuana offense in the Over-the-Rhine district, resulting in her exclusion from the neighborhood.
- Johnson did not live in the zone, but she regularly entered it to care for her five grandchildren and take them to school.
- Michael Au France, a homeless man, was convicted of drug offenses and excluded from the zone.
- Au France relied on social service agencies located within the exclusion zone for food, clothing, and shelter, and his attorney's office was also located there.
- Because of the exclusion notices, Johnson was unable to assist in raising her grandchildren, and Au France was unable to access essential services or meet physically with his attorney.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiffs filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio challenging the constitutionality of the ordinance.
- The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs, declaring the ordinance unconstitutional and enjoining its enforcement.
- The City of Cincinnati appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a municipal ordinance banning individuals arrested for or convicted of drug offenses from entering designated 'drug exclusion zones' violate their constitutional rights to intrastate travel and freedom of association?
Opinions:
Majority - Boyce F. Martin, Jr.
Yes, the ordinance violates the Constitution because it infringes upon the fundamental rights to intrastate travel and freedom of association without being narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. The Court determined that the right to travel locally through public spaces and roadways is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Additionally, the Court found that the ordinance infringed on Johnson's fundamental right to familial association (participating in child-rearing) and Au France's right to associate with his attorney. Because fundamental rights were implicated, the Court applied strict scrutiny. While the City had a compelling interest in enhancing safety and reducing drug crime, the ordinance was not narrowly tailored. It broadly excluded individuals from innocent travel and essential activities (like visiting family or lawyers) without a particularized finding that they were likely to reoffend in the zone. The existence of a variance mechanism was insufficient to cure these defects because it was burdensome and did not cover all constitutionally protected activities.
Dissenting - Ronald Lee Gilman
No, the ordinance should be upheld because there is no fundamental constitutional right to intrastate travel or to the specific types of association claimed by the plaintiffs. The dissent argued that prior circuit precedent established that intrastate travel is not a fundamental right entitled to heightened scrutiny. Consequently, the ordinance should have been reviewed under the rational basis test, which it would likely pass given the City's legitimate interest in fighting drug crime. The dissent also contended that the majority impermissibly expanded the definition of 'freedom of association' to include grandparent visitation and access to a specific attorney's physical office, rights not previously recognized as fundamental by the Supreme Court.
Analysis:
This decision is significant because it explicitly recognizes a 'right to intrastate travel' (specifically the right to travel locally on public roads) as a fundamental right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. This distinguishes it from previous Supreme Court cases that focused primarily on interstate travel. By elevating local travel to a fundamental right, the Sixth Circuit imposes a heavy burden (strict scrutiny) on municipalities attempting to use exclusion zones or banishment as a tool for crime control. The ruling suggests that while cities can police criminal behavior, they cannot broadly banish individuals from public spaces in a way that prevents innocent travel, familial caretaking, or access to legal counsel.
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