Johnson v. Chapman
43 W. Va. 639, 1897 W. Va. LEXIS 66, 28 S.E. 744 (1897)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Where two or more parties, acting independently, commit separate acts of negligence that concurrently and proximately cause a single, indivisible injury to a third party, they are considered joint tortfeasors and may be held jointly and severally liable in a single lawsuit.
Facts:
- Elizabeth Turner was a life tenant of two warehouses.
- Defendant William H. Chapman possessed a warehouse adjacent to Turner's property.
- Defendant Tempest T. Hutchinson possessed a warehouse situated between Chapman's and Turner's properties.
- The party wall between Chapman's and Hutchinson's warehouses was weak, defective, and inadequate.
- The southern outside wall of Hutchinson's warehouse was also weak, unsafe, and defective.
- Both Chapman and Hutchinson negligently permitted their respective walls to remain in an unsafe condition.
- As a result of these co-existing defects, the defendants' warehouses and walls fell together in a single event.
- The collapse of the defendants' buildings crushed and destroyed Turner's adjacent warehouses, causing a single, indivisible injury.
Procedural Posture:
- William D. Johnson, as committee for Elizabeth Turner, filed a lawsuit against William H. Chapman and Tempest T. Hutchinson in the Circuit Court of Ohio County.
- The defendants filed a demurrer to the plaintiff's declaration, arguing that they were improperly joined as defendants in a single lawsuit.
- The Circuit Court (trial court) sustained the demurrer on the ground of misjoinder and dismissed the case.
- The plaintiff, Johnson, appealed the dismissal by obtaining a writ of error from the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Do separate and independent acts of negligence by two or more parties, which concurrently cause a single, indivisible injury, give rise to joint liability, allowing the injured party to sue them together in a single action?
Opinions:
Majority - Dent, Judge
Yes. Where separate acts of negligence by multiple parties concur to produce a single, indivisible injury, the parties are jointly and severally liable and may be sued together. The court reasoned that although the negligent acts were several (i.e., each defendant was responsible for their own wall), they were concurrent causes of the injury. The declaration alleged that the walls fell 'by reason whereof' the separate negligent acts, meaning they combined to produce the single result. When multiple proximate causes contribute to an accident, and each is an efficient cause without which the accident would not have happened, liability may be attributed to all causes. Because the buildings fell together in one indistinguishable mass, making it impossible to separate the damage caused by each, both defendants contributed to the whole injury and can be sued jointly.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the legal principle that concert of action or a common purpose is not required to establish joint liability among tortfeasors. It establishes that concurrent but independent acts of negligence that produce a single, indivisible harm are sufficient to treat the defendants as joint tortfeasors. This lowers the burden for plaintiffs, who can sue all responsible parties in one action rather than bringing separate, complex lawsuits. The case is a foundational example of applying joint and several liability where causation is intertwined and the resulting harm cannot be apportioned among the different negligent actors.
Unlock the full brief for Johnson v. Chapman