Johnson v. California
545 U.S. 162 (2005)
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Rule of Law:
To establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in jury selection under Batson v. Kentucky, a defendant need only produce evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred, not prove that discrimination is more likely than not.
Facts:
- Jay Shawn Johnson, a black male, was on trial for the second-degree murder and assault of a white child.
- During jury selection, 43 eligible prospective jurors remained in the pool, three of whom were black.
- The prosecutor used a peremptory challenge to remove the first black prospective juror.
- After defense counsel's initial objection, the prosecutor used another peremptory challenge to remove the second black prospective juror.
- On the following day, the prosecutor used a third peremptory challenge to remove the final remaining black prospective juror.
- The resulting jury, including alternates, was composed entirely of white jurors.
Procedural Posture:
- In a California trial court, defense counsel for Johnson objected to the prosecutor's peremptory strikes of black jurors, arguing they were racially motivated.
- The trial judge denied the objection, finding Johnson had failed to establish a prima facie case by showing a 'strong likelihood' of racial bias.
- Johnson was convicted of second-degree murder and assault.
- The California Court of Appeal reversed the conviction, holding the trial court applied the wrong, heightened standard for a prima facie case.
- On appeal by the State of California, the California Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal and reinstated the conviction, holding that its 'strong likelihood' standard was consistent with Batson.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict between the standard used by the California Supreme Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
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Issue:
Does California's requirement that a defendant must show it is 'more likely than not' that a prosecutor's peremptory challenges were based on impermissible group bias to establish a prima facie case under Batson v. Kentucky violate the U.S. Constitution?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Stevens
Yes. California's 'more likely than not' standard for a prima facie Batson claim is an unconstitutional burden that is inconsistent with the three-step framework established in Batson v. Kentucky. The first step of Batson only requires a defendant to produce evidence sufficient to support an 'inference' of discriminatory purpose. The Court reasoned that Batson's framework was designed to elicit an explanation from the prosecutor upon a showing of suspicious circumstances, not to require the defendant to prove the ultimate issue of discrimination at the outset. Requiring a 'more likely than not' showing improperly collapses the three-step inquiry into one, forcing the judge to speculate about the prosecutor's motives instead of simply asking for them, thereby undermining Batson's goal of eradicating racial discrimination from the jury selection process.
Dissenting - Justice Thomas
No. The Batson framework is a prophylactic rule, not an independent constitutional command, and Batson itself expressly declined to formulate specific procedures for states to follow. States should have wide discretion to craft their own rules of criminal procedure to implement Batson's requirements. California’s procedure falls comfortably within this broad discretion, and the Court oversteps by dictating the specific burden of proof a state must use.
Concurring - Justice Breyer
Yes. Justice Breyer joined the Court's opinion while referencing his concurring opinion in Miller-El v. Dretke, which suggests a broader concern with the viability of the peremptory challenge system in preventing discrimination.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the standard for the first step of a Batson challenge, lowering the evidentiary bar for defendants. By rejecting the 'more likely than not' standard in favor of an 'inference' standard, the Court makes it easier for defendants to compel prosecutors to provide race-neutral reasons for their peremptory strikes. This strengthens Batson's procedural framework by ensuring that suspicious patterns of strikes are subject to scrutiny rather than being dismissed prematurely based on a judge's speculation. The ruling shifts the focus from a difficult preliminary proof of discrimination to a more straightforward process of inquiry and explanation, thereby enhancing the protection against racial bias in jury selection.
