Johnson v. Brown
1970 Ky. LEXIS 446, 450 S.W.2d 495 (1970)
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Rule of Law:
Kentucky's strict liability statute for dog bites, KRS 258.275(1), abrogates the need to prove an owner's knowledge of the dog's vicious propensities when the injured party's presence near the animal was reasonably anticipated, but it permits the defense of contributory negligence if the injured party failed to exercise ordinary care for their own safety.
Facts:
- Walter Brown came to Robert Johnson and wife Johnson's business premises before usual opening hours to rent garden equipment.
- Mr. Johnson approached Brown from his nearby residence to ascertain Brown's needs.
- Mr. Johnson informed Brown that the business would not be open for approximately half an hour and warned him to 'watch the dog because it might jump at him'.
- The Johnsons kept a German shepherd police dog chained to a post near a driveway between their store building and the street, a location where it was customarily kept during the night.
- While Mr. Johnson's attention was temporarily diverted, Brown walked near the chained dog.
- The German shepherd attacked and bit Brown, causing him personal injuries.
Procedural Posture:
- Walter Brown brought a suit in a trial court against Robert Johnson and wife Johnson for personal injuries.
- A jury rendered a verdict awarding Brown $1,833.15.
- A judgment was entered by the trial court pursuant to the jury's verdict.
- Robert Johnson and wife Johnson (appellants) appealed the judgment to the Kentucky Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Is the owner's knowledge of a dog's vicious propensities a necessary element for liability under KRS 258.275(1) when a person's presence near the dog is reasonably anticipated, and does the statute preclude the defense of contributory negligence?
Opinions:
Majority - PALMORE, Judge
No, the owner's knowledge of a dog's vicious propensities is not a necessary element for liability under KRS 258.275(1) when a person's presence near the dog is reasonably anticipated; however, no, the statute does not preclude the defense of contributory negligence. The court clarified that KRS 258.275(1) imposes a form of strict liability, removing the requirement to prove the owner's knowledge of the dog's vicious propensities if the injured person's proximity to the animal was reasonably anticipated by the owner. This interpretation aligns with the legislative intent to provide a reason for the statute's enactment, as noted in Dykes v. Alexander. However, the court affirmed that contributory negligence remains a valid defense in statutory dog bite actions, consistent with a majority of jurisdictions and prior Kentucky law, citing Wooldridge v. White. The court found that Brown's presence on the Johnsons' business premises was reasonably anticipated and actually known to Mr. Johnson. Therefore, the Johnsons had a statutory duty to prevent Brown from being bitten while he exercised ordinary care for his own safety. The court determined that whether Brown was contributorily negligent, potentially by not realizing the dog's chain length or being distracted by business, was a question of fact for the jury, not a matter of law. Consequently, the trial court's instructions were erroneous for failing to submit the defense of contributory negligence to the jury. The judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded for a new trial with proper instructions.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the application of Kentucky's dog-bite statute, KRS 258.275(1), establishing a dual framework for liability. It affirms that owners face strict liability for injuries caused by their dogs to anticipated visitors, thereby removing the common law burden of proving prior knowledge of the dog's viciousness. Crucially, however, the ruling maintains that this strict liability does not equate to absolute liability, preserving the defense of contributory negligence. This balance allows for victim protection while ensuring that an injured party's own lack of ordinary care can mitigate the owner's liability, prompting trial courts to include appropriate jury instructions regarding comparative fault in such cases.
