Johnson v. Bredesen
130 S.Ct. 541, 558 U.S. 1067 (2009)
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Rule of Law:
A lengthy delay on death row, even one for which the inmate is not primarily responsible, is not currently recognized by the Supreme Court as a per se violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. A claim challenging the constitutionality of such a delay may be treated as the functional equivalent of a habeas corpus petition, thereby subjecting it to the procedural bar against successive petitions.
Facts:
- In 1981, Cecil C. Johnson was convicted of three counts of first-degree murder in Tennessee.
- Johnson was sentenced to death and has been confined in a solitary cell awaiting execution since his conviction.
- Johnson has consistently maintained his innocence, and there was no physical evidence linking him to the murders.
- In 1992, following a change in state law, Johnson gained access to previously undisclosed evidence that undermined the credibility of a key eyewitness who had testified against him.
- At the time of his petition to the Supreme Court, Johnson had been on death row for nearly 29 years.
- Johnson contends that he bears little, if any, responsibility for the lengthy delay in carrying out his sentence.
Procedural Posture:
- Cecil Johnson was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in a Tennessee state trial court in 1981.
- Johnson pursued numerous state and federal appeals and collateral reviews, including a federal habeas corpus petition filed in 1999 which was ultimately denied.
- After Tennessee set an execution date, Johnson filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court, alleging the 29-year delay violated the Eighth Amendment.
- The District Court treated the § 1983 complaint as the 'functional equivalent' of a habeas petition and dismissed it as a procedurally barred successive petition.
- The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the District Court's dismissal.
- Johnson filed a petition for a writ of certiorari and an application for a stay of execution with the U.S. Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does executing a prisoner after a 29-year delay on death row, for which the prisoner bears little responsibility, violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment?
Opinions:
Court Action - Per Curiam
The Court denied the application for a stay of execution and the petition for a writ of certiorari without providing a written opinion on the merits.
Statement respecting denial of certiorari - Justice Stevens
Yes. Executing a prisoner after such an inhumane delay is unacceptably cruel and violates the Eighth Amendment. A delay of nearly three decades, for which Johnson is not responsible and which was partially caused by the State's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, serves no valid penological purpose. The penological justifications for the death penalty, such as retribution and deterrence, diminish as the delay lengthens. Furthermore, the lower courts erred by treating Johnson's civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a successive habeas petition; claims challenging the 'method' of execution, including one based on intolerable delay, are properly brought under § 1983 and should not be ripe until an execution date is set.
Concurring in denial of certiorari - Justice Thomas
No. The Eighth Amendment does not prohibit a state from carrying out a death sentence after a long delay that resulted from the prisoner's own appeals. There is no authority in American constitutional tradition or this Court's precedent for the proposition that a defendant can avail himself of the full panoply of appellate and collateral procedures and then complain when his execution is consequently delayed. The underlying claim has no constitutional foundation, so the procedural questions of whether it should be brought as a § 1983 action or a habeas petition are irrelevant. Because a successful claim would invalidate the death sentence, the Sixth Circuit was correct to treat it as the functional equivalent of a habeas petition.
Analysis:
This case highlights the Supreme Court's persistent refusal to grant certiorari to squarely address the constitutionality of executing inmates after decades-long delays on death row, known as a 'Lackey claim.' The dueling opinions from Justices Stevens and Thomas demonstrate a deep and ongoing ideological divide on whether such delays constitute an independent Eighth Amendment violation. The case also underscores the significant procedural barriers capital defendants face, as lower courts may re-characterize civil rights lawsuits challenging the delay as successive habeas petitions, effectively preventing the claim from ever being heard on its merits. By denying certiorari, the Court leaves the substantive constitutional question and its procedural complexities unresolved for lower courts.
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