Johnson v. Bradley
4 Cal. 4th 389, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 470, 841 P.2d 990 (1992)
Rule of Law:
A charter city's ordinance providing for partial public funding of local election campaigns is a "municipal affair" under Article XI, section 5, subdivision (a) of the California Constitution, and therefore supersedes a conflicting state statute banning such funding, unless the state statute addresses a "statewide concern" and is both reasonably related and narrowly tailored to resolve that concern.
Facts:
- In June 1988, State Assemblyman Ross Johnson and State Senator Quentin Kopp, along with City Councilmember Ernani Bernardi, successfully sponsored a statewide initiative, Proposition 73.
- Proposition 73 added chapter 5 to the Political Reform Act of 1974, which included Government Code section 85300, stating: "No public officer shall expend and no candidate shall accept any public moneys for the purpose of seeking elective office."
- Two years later, the voters of the City of Los Angeles amended the city charter by adopting Measure H, a comprehensive campaign, election, and ethics reform plan.
- Measure H provided for the creation of a city ethics commission, limitations on campaign contributions, limitations on total contributions, prohibitions on the transfer of contributions, disclosure of candidates’ economic interests and income, and limitations on gifts and honoraria.
- Unlike Proposition 73, Measure H also imposed spending limitations, which were conditioned on a candidate’s acceptance of public funds, in response to the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Buckley v. Valeo.
- Charter section 313, codified from Measure H, provided for partial public funding of city political campaigns, explicitly stating that funds used for matching funds "shall come exclusively from City sources of revenues."
Procedural Posture:
- Petitioners (State Assemblyman Ross Johnson, State Senator Quentin Kopp, and Los Angeles City Councilmember Ernani Bernardi) invoked the original jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal to enjoin respondents (Mayor of Los Angeles, city council members, city controller, and city clerk) from implementing and enforcing charter section 313.
- The Court of Appeal issued an alternative writ and a temporary restraining order, enjoining implementation and enforcement of the challenged section.
- The Court of Appeal rejected respondents' procedural claims regarding standing and proper parties.
- The Court of Appeal rejected amici curiae's argument that Government Code section 85300 had been rendered inoperative by federal court proceedings.
- By a split vote, the Court of Appeal agreed with respondents, concluding that a charter city's decision to provide its own public funds for city political campaigns is a "municipal affair" and not a matter of "statewide concern," thus holding that charter section 313 prevails over Government Code section 85300.
- The Court of Appeal discharged the alternative writ, denied the peremptory writ of mandate, and dissolved the temporary stay.
- The California Supreme Court granted review to address the municipal affairs issue.
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Issue:
Does Article XI, section 5 of the California Constitution permit a charter city to enact an ordinance providing for partial public funding of municipal election campaigns, thereby superseding a state law (Government Code section 85300) that broadly prohibits public funding of election campaigns, when the state law is not reasonably related to resolving a legitimate statewide concern?
Opinions:
Majority - Lucas, C. J.
Yes, Article XI, section 5 of the California Constitution permits a charter city to enact an ordinance providing for partial public funding of municipal election campaigns, superseding a state law that broadly prohibits such funding, because the state law is not reasonably related to resolving a legitimate statewide concern. The court reviewed the evolution of "home rule" in California, noting how amendments to Article XI, Section 5, particularly the 1914 amendment, granted charter cities broader autonomy over "municipal affairs." Applying the framework established in California Fed. Savings & Loan Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (CalFed), the court first acknowledged that Measure H (charter section 313) clearly "implicates" a municipal affair. It then focused on whether Government Code section 85300 (Proposition 73's ban) qualifies as a matter of "statewide concern" and, if so, whether it is reasonably related and narrowly tailored to address that concern. The court rejected several arguments for statewide concern: (1) the intent of Proposition 73's drafters or voters to create a uniform statewide rule, stating that the Legislature cannot unilaterally define what constitutes a statewide concern; (2) the County of Sacramento decision, distinguishing it as concerning charter counties which have less expansive "home rule" powers than charter cities, and criticizing its lack of a "convincing basis" for deeming campaign finance a statewide concern; (3) fiscal arguments, emphasizing that the expenditure of local tax dollars for local elections is a matter of paramount municipal concern, not a statewide one; and (4) the argument regarding "extremist candidates," finding no legitimate state interest in discriminating against such candidates who meet objective eligibility criteria for public funds. While agreeing that the "integrity of the electoral process" is a legitimate statewide concern, the court concluded that Section 85300's ban on public funding is not reasonably related to enhancing this integrity. Citing Buckley v. Valeo, the court reasoned that public financing, by reducing reliance on large private contributions, actually furthers the goal of eliminating improper influence and allows for constitutionally permissible spending limits, thereby enhancing rather than undermining electoral integrity. Since the state ban was not reasonably related to a statewide concern, the court did not need to address whether it was narrowly tailored. Thus, Measure H, as a municipal affair, prevails.
Concurring - Kennard, J.
Justice Kennard concurred with the majority's result and its decision to resolve the case based on the "home rule" theory rather than the "severability" theory (which would question the validity of Government Code section 85300 itself). She emphasized the judicial principle of exercising the power to declare a statute invalid only when strictly necessary and avoiding constitutional questions if possible. While both the home rule and severability theories involve constitutional questions, she found the home rule approach preferable. This is because upholding Measure H under home rule affects only a local ordinance and avoids invalidating a state law, adhering more closely to judicial restraint.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Mosk, J.
Justice Mosk concurred in the judgment but dissented from the majority's reasoning, characterizing its discussion of the "municipal affairs" doctrine as an "advisory opinion." He argued that the court should have first determined the validity of Government Code section 85300. He contended that Section 85300, a part of Proposition 73, should be invalidated because it is not severable from other provisions of Proposition 73 that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had already declared unconstitutional for violating the First and Fourteenth Amendments (e.g., contribution limits and expenditure limitations). Justice Mosk reasoned that Proposition 73 failed the "volitional severability" test, meaning the electorate would not have adopted the ban on public financing in isolation, without the related campaign finance reform provisions. He highlighted that Proposition 73 was presented to voters as a "Campaign Contribution Limits Without Taxpayer Financing" package, and was offered as an "all-or-nothing" alternative to Proposition 68, which included public financing. Therefore, since Section 85300 itself is invalid, there is no state law for the city charter provision to conflict with, rendering the "municipal affairs" analysis moot and unnecessary.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces the "home rule" authority of California charter cities, particularly regarding matters deemed "municipal affairs." It clarifies the application of the CalFed test, underscoring that legislative intent or a mere assertion of statewide concern is insufficient; courts must identify a "convincing basis for legislative action originating in extramural concerns." By finding that a state ban on public campaign funding is not reasonably related to enhancing electoral integrity, the decision empowers charter cities to experiment with campaign finance reforms, including public funding, that they believe best serve their local interests. Future cases involving conflicts between state and local law in charter cities will likely scrutinize more deeply whether the state's interest is genuinely statewide, reasonably related, and narrowly tailored, preventing state overreach into local governance.
