John v. Baker
1999 WL 692604, 1999 Alas. LEXIS 123, 982 P.2d 738 (1999)
Rule of Law:
Federally recognized Native tribes in Alaska possess the inherent sovereign power to adjudicate child custody disputes between tribal members in their own courts, even when the dispute arises outside of "Indian country." This tribal court jurisdiction is concurrent with state courts, and state courts should generally recognize tribal court judgments under the doctrine of comity, provided the tribal court had jurisdiction and the proceedings afforded due process.
Facts:
- Anita John and John Baker had two children together: John Jr., born in July 1991, and Emmanuel, born in June 1992.
- Ms. John is a member of Mentasta Village, and Mr. Baker is a member of Northway Village, both Alaska Native tribes.
- The family lived together in Ms. John's village until the parents ended their relationship in 1993.
- For the next two years, Ms. John and Mr. Baker cooperated in sharing custody of their children.
- In July 1995, Mr. Baker refused to return the children to Ms. John.
- Mr. Baker filed a petition with the Northway Tribal Court requesting sole custody of John Jr. and Emmanuel.
- Ms. John consented to Northway Tribal Court's jurisdiction.
- The Northway Tribal Court ordered the parents to share custody of the children on an alternating monthly schedule in August 1995.
Procedural Posture:
- Mr. Baker filed a petition with the Northway Tribal Court requesting sole custody of his children, John Jr. and Emmanuel.
- The Northway Tribal Court issued an order granting shared custody to Ms. John and Mr. Baker.
- Mr. Baker subsequently filed an identical child custody suit in the state superior court.
- Ms. John filed a motion in the superior court to dismiss the state action, citing the tribal court proceeding.
- The state superior court denied Ms. John's motion, ruling that the Indian Child Welfare Act did not apply and that the state court had subject matter jurisdiction.
- The state superior court initially issued a temporary custody order identical to the tribal court's, but later altered it to give Mr. Baker primary custody.
- The state superior court entered a final order maintaining Mr. Baker as primary physical custodian and granting Ms. John visitation.
- Ms. John appealed the superior court's final order to the Supreme Court of Alaska, arguing that her motion to dismiss should have been granted.
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Issue:
Does a federally recognized Native tribe in Alaska possess the inherent sovereign power to adjudicate child custody disputes between its members in tribal courts when the dispute arises outside of "Indian country," and if so, should state courts recognize such tribal court decisions?
Opinions:
Majority - Fabe, Justice
Yes, federally recognized Native tribes in Alaska do possess the inherent sovereign power to adjudicate child custody disputes between tribal members in their own courts, even if the dispute arises outside of "Indian country." The court found that previous decisions limiting tribal adjudicatory power (e.g., Nenana and F.P.) were rooted in the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and Public Law 280 (P.L. 280), neither of which applies to this case; ICWA's "divorce exception" applies to inter-parental disputes, and Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government (Venetie II) established that most Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) lands do not qualify as "Indian country," thus limiting P.L. 280's applicability. The court defers to Congress's and the Executive Branch's recognition of Alaska Native villages as sovereign tribes. Relying on federal Indian law principles, particularly United States v. Wheeler and Montana v. United States, the court affirmed that tribes retain inherent sovereign powers to regulate internal domestic affairs like child custody between members, unless Congress explicitly divests such authority. This power stems from tribal membership, not solely the existence of Indian country. Post-ANCSA federal statutes (e.g., the Federally Recognized Tribe List Act and Tribal Justice Act) reinforce Congress's intent for Alaska Natives to retain self-governance. This tribal jurisdiction is concurrent with state courts, meaning state courts also retain jurisdiction over such disputes. When a tribal court adjudicates such a dispute, it may apply its own tribal law and custom. State courts should recognize tribal court decisions under the doctrine of comity, which demands deference and mutual respect, unless the tribal court lacked personal or subject matter jurisdiction, or the proceedings violated due process. The case is remanded to the superior court to determine the children's tribal membership (applying tribal law) and whether the tribal court's procedures comported with due process.
Dissenting - Matthews, Chief Justice, joined by Compton, Justice
No, inherent tribal jurisdiction over child custody cases does not extend beyond "Indian country," and the Northway Tribal Court therefore lacks jurisdiction in this case. The dissent argues that the "allocative principle" of federal Indian law dictates that state law generally applies outside of Indian country unless Congress explicitly provides for tribal authority. Previous Supreme Court cases, such as DeCoteau v. District County Court and Fisher v. District Court, unequivocally held that a tribe's inherent power to adjudicate child custody cases is limited to cases arising in "Indian country." The dissent contends that the majority mistakenly reverses this established principle. Furthermore, the dissent asserts that neither ANCSA nor post-ANCSA federal statutes (Tribe List Act, Tribal Justice Act, ICWA) explicitly grant tribal court jurisdiction over custody disputes outside of Indian country. Extrapolating such jurisdiction from ICWA is inappropriate and ignores the specific protections (like parental veto over transfer to tribal courts) that Congress built into ICWA. The dissent also argues that inherent tribal sovereignty pertains only to tribal members, and extending jurisdiction to cases involving a non-tribal member is an unwarranted expansion. Policy arguments for expanding tribal jurisdiction, such as convenience or cultural sensitivity, should be addressed by Congress, not the courts, as judicial restraint requires. Finally, the dissent contends that allowing tribal law to trump state law outside of Indian country contradicts Public Law 280, which requires tribal customs to be consistent with state law, and creates undesirable incentives for forum shopping, undermining legal uniformity as warned by Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.
Analysis:
This case represents a significant expansion of recognized inherent tribal sovereignty in Alaska, moving beyond a purely territorial understanding of jurisdiction to acknowledge a non-territorial, membership-based adjudicatory authority for federally recognized tribes over internal domestic relations like child custody. By affirming concurrent state and tribal jurisdiction and applying the doctrine of comity, the decision establishes a complex dual legal system for Native children in Alaska, raising questions about legal uniformity, the enforcement of state laws, and potential forum shopping. Future cases will likely grapple with the practical application of comity, particularly regarding due process standards and public policy exceptions, and will need to delineate the precise scope of "membership sovereignty" in other areas of law.
