John Russell Webster, Cross-Appellants v. The City of Houston, Cross-Appellee
735 F.2d 838 (1984)
Rule of Law:
A municipality is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a deprivation of rights inflicted pursuant to an official policy, which includes a persistent, widespread practice (custom) where actual or constructive knowledge of such custom is attributable to the municipality’s governing body or an official to whom that body has delegated policy-making authority.
Facts:
- Randy Webster, a 17-year-old, stole a van from an auto dealership in southeast Houston, Texas, by driving it through a showroom window.
- Members of the Houston Police Department began pursuit, leading to a dangerous, lengthy, high-speed chase.
- After the van was stopped, Randy emerged unarmed.
- Officers Mays and Olin began to hit Randy and pull his hair, during which Officer Mays’ pistol discharged, striking Randy in the head and hand, resulting in his death.
- A fellow officer provided Officer Mays with a “throw down weapon” to place next to Randy’s body to falsely suggest he had been armed.
- All police officers at the scene who later gave statements falsely declared that Randy was armed.
- An internal investigation by the Houston Police Department (HPD) exonerated the officers despite at least one firsthand witness, a cab driver, stating Randy was unarmed.
- Randy’s parents provoked a federal investigation over a year later, which ultimately revealed the true story of the shooting and cover-up.
- Plaintiffs sought to prove that the City maintained a custom of using excessive police force that caused Randy's death.
Procedural Posture:
- Randy Webster’s parents (John and Billie Webster) brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking damages from the City of Houston, the Houston Police Department, and certain named policemen in the district court.
- The district court entered judgment against the City of Houston based on a jury finding that the City maintained a custom of using excessive police force.
- The City of Houston appealed the district court's judgment to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
- A panel of the Fifth Circuit affirmed the finding of liability but rejected the award of punitive damages and remanded for a retrial on the issue of damages.
- The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals granted rehearing en banc to decide whether sufficient evidence existed to support the jury verdict of municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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Issue:
Did the district court err in its jury instructions and exclusion of evidence regarding municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, by failing to adhere to the established standard requiring that actual or constructive knowledge of a widespread custom be attributable to the municipality's governing body or an official with delegated policymaking authority?
Opinions:
Majority - PER CURIAM
Yes, the district court erred in its jury instructions and exclusion of evidence because they did not comply with the standard for municipal liability under § 1983 newly adopted by this court. The established standard for municipal liability requires that a 'custom' be a persistent, widespread practice of city officials or employees, so common and well-settled as to constitute municipal policy, and that actual or constructive knowledge of such custom must be attributable to the governing body of the municipality or to an official to whom that body has delegated policy-making authority. The district court's instructions were too lax, defining "high-ranking officials" too broadly to include "similarly ranked officials" without requiring proof of delegated policymaking authority, thereby risking a violation of the prohibition against respondeat superior liability. Furthermore, the court erred in refusing to allow plaintiffs to offer proof of other claimed instances of excessive force by Houston police, which is critical evidence to establish that a custom was "persistent," "widespread," "common," and "well settled" and to attribute constructive knowledge to policymakers, as required by this court's decision in Bennett v. City of Slidell.
Dissenting - Jerre S. Williams
No, the district court’s jury instructions, when considered as a whole, did accurately comply with the legal standard for municipal liability, and there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding of liability. The instructions required the jury to find a 'regular pattern of such conduct' from which it could be inferred that the City, 'through its high ranking officials' (including the mayor, city council, or police chief), implicitly authorized or approved the conduct. This definition of policymaker, especially in a large and complex government like Houston's, implicitly acknowledges delegation of policymaking authority to the Chief of Police, consistent with Bennett v. City of Slidell. Evidence demonstrated a persistent and widespread custom among HPD officers of carrying and using "throw down weapons" to conceal excessive force, which was widely known within the department, even mentioned in the police academy, and perpetuated by lax property room procedures and perfunctory investigations. This custom constituted city policy through deliberate indifference or knowing condonation by high-ranking officials, satisfying the requirements for municipal liability under § 1983.
Dissenting - Alvin B. Rubin
No, the district court’s charge should be affirmed because, even if the instruction on 'high-ranking officials' did not perfectly align with the Bennett standard requiring delegated policymaking authority (a standard developed after the trial of this case), the specific objection made at trial was different. The objection was that the instruction would permit respondeat superior liability, which the charge, read as a whole, did not allow. Given that the court's precise formulation of the standard came years after this trial, the district court should not be reversed for lacking such foresight or for failing to address an objection that was not clearly made, especially when the charge as a whole was fundamentally correct.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the standard for municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, particularly concerning claims based on a 'custom.' It emphasizes that for a municipality to be liable for the actions of its employees under a custom, the custom must be a 'persistent, widespread practice,' and there must be actual or constructive knowledge of this practice attributable to the city's governing body or to officials with delegated policymaking authority. This ruling prevents finding liability based merely on the widespread knowledge of lower-level employees or on isolated incidents, thereby limiting municipal liability and distinguishing it from respondeat superior. Future cases will require plaintiffs to demonstrate a clearer link between a persistent, known custom and the highest levels of city policymaking or delegated authority.
