John A. Russell Corp. v. Bohlig
739 A.2d 1212, 170 Vt. 12, 15 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1419 (1999)
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Rule of Law:
Under the Vermont Rules of Evidence, specific instances of a witness's conduct, offered for the purpose of attacking their character for truthfulness, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. Such matters may only be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness whose credibility is being challenged.
Facts:
- In May 1989, John A. Russell Corporation hired James Bohlig as an executive under a three-year employment contract.
- The contract stated that after 24 months, the Corporation could terminate Bohlig with twelve months' written notice or twelve months of severance pay in lieu of notice.
- The contract allowed for immediate termination without notice or severance pay for specific reasons, including 'dishonesty in the performance of his duties'.
- With the Corporation's permission, Bohlig used company employees and equipment to perform extensive renovations on his home, ultimately costing over $600,000.
- The Corporation terminated Bohlig's employment after the 24-month mark, but before the three-year term had expired.
- The Corporation alleged that Bohlig was dishonest regarding the scope of his home renovations and his ability to pay for them, and that a balance of over $200,000 was still owed.
- Bohlig disputed the reason for his termination and claimed the Corporation owed him severance pay, unpaid bonuses, and relocation expenses under the contract.
Procedural Posture:
- The John A. Russell Corporation sued James Bohlig in a Vermont trial court for breach of contract and other claims.
- Bohlig filed a counterclaim against the Corporation for breach of his employment contract, seeking severance pay and other benefits.
- During the trial, the court allowed the Corporation's owner to testify that Bohlig had been terminated from a previous job for dishonesty.
- A jury returned a verdict largely in favor of the Corporation, awarding it $218,413.20, and awarding Bohlig only $2,828.25 on his counterclaim.
- The trial court entered a final judgment reflecting the jury's verdict.
- Bohlig appealed the judgment on his counterclaim to the Supreme Court of Vermont, arguing the trial court made errors in its rulings on contract ambiguity and the admission of character evidence.
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Issue:
Does the admission of extrinsic evidence, through the testimony of a witness other than the one being impeached, showing that a party was terminated from a previous job for dishonesty violate Vermont Rule of Evidence 608(b)?
Opinions:
Majority - Johnson, J.
Yes. The admission of extrinsic evidence, through another witness's testimony, to prove a party's prior dishonest act violates Vermont Rule of Evidence 608(b). The court found that V.R.E. 608(b) creates a clear prohibition against proving specific instances of conduct to attack a witness's credibility through extrinsic evidence, which is defined as evidence offered through a witness other than the one being impeached. While such conduct may be inquired into during the cross-examination of the witness themselves, it is not permissible to have another witness (in this case, Mr. Russell) testify about the prior act (Bohlig's termination from a previous job). The court rejected the Corporation's arguments that the evidence was admissible for context under V.R.E. 404(b) or as an essential element of its defense under V.R.E. 405(b). Because the erroneously admitted evidence of prior dishonesty was highly similar to the alleged dishonesty at issue in the case, the court found it was highly prejudicial and required a new trial.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the strict limitations on using character evidence to prove conforming conduct in civil cases, particularly the method of proving prior specific acts. The court's holding clarifies that V.R.E. 608(b) is not merely a suggestion but a strict bar on using extrinsic evidence to impeach a witness's credibility regarding prior conduct. This protects litigants from 'trial by ambush' over collateral past events and prevents juries from making propensity-based inferences (i.e., 'he did it before, so he must have done it again'). The ruling emphasizes the high risk of prejudice associated with this type of evidence, especially when the prior act mirrors the conduct alleged in the current dispute, solidifying the procedure that such impeachment is confined solely to cross-examination of the witness in question.
