Jim Dale Hull v. Merck & Company, Inc.
17 Fed. R. Serv. 1486, 758 F.2d 1474, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 29167 (1985)
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Rule of Law:
Under Georgia law, a worker with knowledge of the general hazards of chemical exposure who voluntarily continues to work without provided safety equipment, especially after a significant exposure incident, has assumed the risk of injury, which can serve as a complete bar to recovery in a negligence action.
Facts:
- Merck & Company, Inc. (Merck) hired Augusta Fiberglass Coatings (AFC), Jim Dale Hull's employer, to replace waste chemical sewer pipes at its operational plants in Albany, Georgia.
- Merck informed bidders, including AFC, that the plants would remain operational during the project, requiring safety precautions.
- Hull, a supervisor with long experience working with chemicals, began work on September 4, 1980.
- Although Merck and AFC provided safety gear like rubber suits, goggles, and masks, Hull stopped wearing the equipment after the first few days.
- Hull acknowledged at the time that he knew the chemical fumes were a health hazard.
- On September 22, 1980, Hull stuck his head inside a pipe containing a highly concentrated toluene solution, causing him to become dizzy and nauseous, requiring him to receive oxygen.
- Despite this severe exposure incident, Hull voluntarily continued working on the project for another month or more.
- Within a year of completing the job, Hull was diagnosed with bone marrow depression and subsequently leukemia.
Procedural Posture:
- Jim Dale Hull sued Merck & Company, Inc. in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia for negligence.
- The case proceeded to a jury trial.
- At trial, the judge, over Hull's objection, provided the jury with an instruction on the legal defense of assumption of the risk.
- The jury returned a verdict in favor of Merck.
- Hull, as the appellant, appealed the judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, arguing that the evidence did not warrant the assumption of risk instruction.
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Issue:
Under Georgia law, is a jury instruction on the defense of assumption of the risk warranted when an experienced plaintiff, aware of the general dangers of chemical exposure, forgoes provided safety equipment, and continues to work for a month after a specific, severe exposure incident?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
Yes, a jury instruction on the defense of assumption of the risk was warranted. A plaintiff assumes the risk under Georgia law when they knowingly and voluntarily choose an obviously perilous course of conduct and fully appreciate the danger involved. The court found ample evidence for the instruction, emphasizing that Hull was an experienced worker who knew that handling waste chemicals required protective measures. His decision to forgo the provided safety equipment, his own admission that the fumes were a health hazard, and most critically, his choice to continue working for over a month after the severe toluene exposure on September 22, provided more than enough basis for a jury to conclude he had assumed the risks associated with the job. The court clarified that perfect knowledge of the specific risk (i.e., leukemia) is not necessary; awareness of the general danger is sufficient.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the application of the assumption of risk doctrine in the context of toxic torts and workplace chemical exposure. The court's decision establishes that a plaintiff's subjective understanding of general danger, demonstrated through experience and conduct, can be sufficient to bar recovery, even without specific knowledge of the precise long-term health consequences. This precedent strengthens the assumption of risk defense for employers and property owners in cases where an experienced worker, aware of hazards, fails to use provided safety equipment and continues employment after an incident that highlights the danger. It underscores that the voluntariness of the plaintiff's continued exposure is a critical element in the analysis.
