Jett v. Dallas Independent School District
491 U.S. 701 (1989)
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Rule of Law:
The express cause of action for damages provided by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 constitutes the exclusive federal damages remedy for the violation of rights guaranteed by 42 U.S.C. § 1981 when the claim is against a state actor. Consequently, a municipality may not be held liable for its employees' violations of § 1981 under a theory of respondeat superior and can only be held liable if the violation resulted from an official 'policy or custom' as required by Monell v. Department of Social Services.
Facts:
- Norman Jett, a white male, was employed by the Dallas Independent School District (DISD) as a teacher, athletic director, and head football coach at South Oak Cliff High School, where the student body became predominantly black over time.
- Dr. Fredrick Todd, a black man, was assigned as the school's principal in 1975, and he and Jett frequently clashed over school policies and Jett's management of the football program.
- Following a football game in 1982, Todd objected to Jett's public statements about players' academic eligibility and his comments to game officials.
- In March 1983, Todd recommended to DISD's director of athletics that Jett be removed from his positions as athletic director and head coach, citing poor leadership and other performance issues.
- Jett met with DISD Superintendent Linus Wright, alleging that Todd's recommendation was motivated by racial animus and a desire to replace him with a black coach.
- After a meeting with other officials, Superintendent Wright affirmed Todd's recommendation and officially removed Jett from his coaching and athletic director duties.
- Jett was reassigned to a teaching-only position at another school and, after another temporary reassignment, he formally resigned from the DISD.
Procedural Posture:
- Norman Jett sued the Dallas Independent School District (DISD) and Principal Todd in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983.
- A jury returned a verdict in favor of Jett, awarding damages against both DISD and Todd.
- The District Court denied the defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, holding that DISD could be liable under § 1981 on a theory of respondeat superior.
- DISD was the appellant when it appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Jett was the appellee. (Principal Todd settled and was no longer a party).
- The Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding that a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1981 on a respondeat superior theory and that the jury instructions on § 1983 liability were erroneous. It remanded the case.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on separate petitions from both Jett and DISD to resolve the conflict among circuits and clarify the standard for municipal liability.
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Issue:
Does the express cause of action for damages provided by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of federal rights by state actors constitute the exclusive federal damages remedy for the violation of the rights guaranteed by 42 U.S.C. § 1981, thereby precluding a claim against a municipality based on a theory of respondeat superior?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice O'Connor
Yes, the express cause of action for damages created by § 1983 constitutes the exclusive federal remedy for violation of the rights guaranteed in § 1981 by state governmental units. Therefore, a claim against a municipality for such a violation cannot be based on a theory of respondeat superior. The Court reasoned through a detailed historical analysis of the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 (the origin of § 1981) and 1871 (the origin of § 1983). The 1866 Act created rights but did not provide an express damages remedy against state actors. In contrast, the 1871 Act explicitly created a civil 'action at law' (§ 1983) to enforce these rights against those acting under color of state law. The Court concluded that Congress intended this specific remedy in § 1983 to be the sole vehicle for such claims. Allowing a broader, implied remedy under § 1981 with respondeat superior liability would permit plaintiffs to circumvent the 'policy or custom' limitation on municipal liability established in Monell, upsetting the careful balance Congress struck in § 1983. The Court remanded the case for a determination, under state law, of whether any official possessed 'final policymaking authority' sufficient to impose liability on the school district.
Dissenting - Justice Brennan
No, § 1981 itself affords an independent cause of action for damages against governmental entities, which is not preempted by § 1983 and which permits liability on a respondeat superior basis. The dissent argued that the Court was deciding an issue not properly raised by the parties below. It contended that the long-standing judicial practice of implying a damages remedy for the violation of a federal right supports a direct cause of action under § 1981 against all violators, both private and public. The dissent reasoned that § 1983 was not intended to implicitly repeal the pre-existing remedy under § 1981, especially since the 1871 Act contained a non-supersession clause. Furthermore, the textual basis for rejecting respondeat superior in Monell (the 'causes to be subjected' language in § 1983) is absent from § 1981, suggesting that vicarious liability should apply.
Dissenting - Justice Stevens
No, for the reasons stated in Justice Brennan's dissent and in his own prior opinions on related issues, § 1983 should not be held to be the exclusive remedy for violations of § 1981 by state actors.
Concurring - Justice Scalia
Yes, § 1983 provides the exclusive remedy. Rather than relying on legislative history, this conclusion flows from basic principles of statutory construction. The more specific statute governing liability of state actors for civil rights violations (§ 1983) should control the more general statute declaring rights (§ 1981). To allow a different, more expansive mode of liability under the general statute would violate the principle that the specific governs the general and that related statutes should be interpreted harmoniously.
Analysis:
This decision significantly harmonizes civil rights litigation against state and local governments by preventing plaintiffs from using § 1981 as an 'end-run' around the strict limitations on municipal liability established for § 1983 in Monell. It solidifies the 'policy or custom' requirement as the exclusive standard for holding a municipal entity financially responsible for its employees' constitutional and federal statutory violations. The ruling forces plaintiffs to prove a systemic or high-level failure within the governmental entity, rather than simply proving the misconduct of a single, lower-level employee. This raises the bar for plaintiffs seeking damages from municipalities and reinforces federalism concerns by shielding local governments from broad vicarious liability.
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