Jeter v. Mayo Clinic Arizona
121 P.3d 1256, 211 Ariz. 376, 467 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 5 (2005)
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Rule of Law:
Under Arizona law, a cryopreserved, unimplanted pre-embryo is not a 'person' for the purposes of the state's wrongful death statute. However, parties may pursue other common law claims for the loss of such pre-embryos, including negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of a bailment contract.
Facts:
- Belinda and William Jeter sought fertility services from Mayo Clinic Arizona.
- Mayo retrieved eggs from Belinda Jeter and fertilized them in vitro with William Jeter's sperm, creating several pre-embryos.
- The Jeters entered into a written agreement with Mayo to cryopreserve and store the resulting pre-embryos for future use.
- After two unsuccessful implantation attempts at Mayo, the Jeters decided to transfer their ten remaining cryopreserved pre-embryos to a different facility, the Arizona Center for Fertility Studies.
- The Jeters arranged the transfer, and Mayo released four labeled straws which purportedly contained the ten pre-embryos.
- Upon arrival at the new clinic, a doctor discovered that two of the four straws were empty and had never contained any embryonic matter, meaning five pre-embryos were missing.
- Mayo failed to provide an account for the five missing pre-embryos.
- The Jeters used the remaining five pre-embryos in a subsequent procedure, which resulted in a successful pregnancy and the birth of their daughter.
Procedural Posture:
- Belinda and William Jeter sued Mayo Clinic Arizona in Arizona superior court (trial court) on four counts: wrongful death, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of bailment contract.
- Mayo filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
- The superior court granted Mayo's motion, dismissing all four of the Jeters' claims.
- The court specifically found that pre-embryos are not 'persons' under the wrongful death statute and that the other claims were either not recognized in Arizona or were barred by the state's medical malpractice act.
- The Jeters filed a motion for reconsideration, which the superior court denied.
- The Jeters (appellants) appealed the dismissal to the Arizona Court of Appeals (intermediate appellate court), with Mayo as the appellee.
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Issue:
Does a cryopreserved, unimplanted, three-day-old pre-embryo constitute a 'person' under Arizona's wrongful death statute, A.R.S. § 12-611?
Opinions:
Majority - Kessler, Judge
No, a cryopreserved, unimplanted pre-embryo is not a 'person' under Arizona’s wrongful death statute. The court relied on the precedent set in Summerfield v. Superior Court, which defined a 'person' for wrongful death purposes as a 'viable fetus' capable of sustaining life independently of the mother's body. A cryopreserved pre-embryo does not meet this standard of present viability; it only has the potential to become viable after implantation and significant development. The court concluded that expanding the definition of 'person' involves complex scientific, ethical, and social policy questions that are best addressed by the Legislature, not the judiciary. While the wrongful death claim fails, the court held that pre-embryos are not mere property and occupy an 'interim category' deserving special respect, thus allowing the Jeters' other claims for negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of bailment to proceed.
Concurring - Timmer, Judge
No, pre-implantation fertilized human eggs are not 'persons' for purposes of A.R.S. § 12-611. The concurring opinion agrees with the majority's conclusion but argues the analysis should have been confined to the legal framework established in Summerfield. The judge contends that the majority's extensive discussion of the scientific and ethical debate concerning when life begins was unnecessary to resolve the core legislative intent behind the wrongful death statute. The issue should be decided solely by applying existing legal precedent, which clearly limits 'personhood' in this context to viable fetuses.
Analysis:
This decision establishes the legal status of cryopreserved pre-embryos in Arizona, classifying them in an 'interim category'—more than mere property but less than legal 'persons.' By denying wrongful death claims while allowing other tort and contract actions, the court created a new framework for redressing harm in the context of assisted reproductive technology. This ruling provides a remedy for prospective parents who suffer a loss due to a clinic's negligence without judicially expanding the definition of personhood, a contentious issue the court deferred to the legislature. The case sets a significant precedent for how courts handle the novel legal questions arising from modern fertility treatments.
