Jennings v. Rodriguez
200 L. Ed. 2d 122, 138 S.Ct. 830, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 1516 (2018)
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Rule of Law:
The plain text of federal immigration statutes 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b) and 1226(c) mandates the detention of certain aliens pending removal proceedings, without an implicit time limit or a right to periodic bond hearings. The canon of constitutional avoidance cannot be used to rewrite clear statutory language to include such procedural protections.
Facts:
- Alejandro Rodriguez, a lawful permanent resident from Mexico, was convicted in 2004 of a drug offense and vehicle theft.
- Following his convictions, the U.S. government took Rodriguez into custody under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) to begin removal proceedings.
- Rodriguez remained in detention for over three years while he litigated the government's attempt to remove him.
- The case also involves other non-citizens, such as asylum seekers who established a credible fear of persecution, who were detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b).
- Members of the class represented by Rodriguez were detained for six months or longer during the course of their immigration proceedings without being afforded a bond hearing.
Procedural Posture:
- Alejandro Rodriguez filed a habeas corpus petition in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, seeking a bond hearing to challenge his prolonged detention.
- The District Court certified a class of non-citizens detained for longer than six months under various immigration statutes, including §§ 1225(b) and 1226(c).
- The District Court granted a permanent injunction requiring the government to provide class members with bond hearings every six months.
- The government (Jennings, et al.) appealed the injunction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
- The Ninth Circuit, as the intermediate appellate court, affirmed the District Court's order, reasoning that the canon of constitutional avoidance required interpreting the statutes to include an implicit right to periodic bond hearings.
- The government successfully petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Do federal immigration statutes 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b) and 1226(c) require the government to provide detained aliens with periodic bond hearings every six months?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Alito
No. The plain text of the immigration statutes at issue does not support the imposition of periodic bond hearings, and the canon of constitutional avoidance does not permit a court to rewrite unambiguous statutory text. The language of §§ 1225(b) and 1226(c) is clear and mandatory. Section 1225(b) states that certain aliens 'shall be detained' for a specific purpose—until their asylum application or removal proceeding is concluded. Similarly, § 1226(c) requires that the Attorney General 'shall take into custody' certain criminal aliens and permits release 'only if' narrow witness-protection conditions are met, implying that no other form of release, such as on bond, is authorized. The Ninth Circuit's reliance on Zadvydas v. Davis was misplaced because that case interpreted a different, ambiguous statute (§ 1231(a)(6)) that used the permissive term 'may be detained' and applied to potentially indefinite post-removal-order detention. Because the statutory provisions here are not susceptible to more than one plausible construction, the canon of constitutional avoidance has no application. The Court reverses the Ninth Circuit and remands for consideration of the respondents' direct constitutional claims.
Concurring - Justice Thomas
No. While agreeing with the majority's interpretation of the statutes, the Court should have first found that it lacked jurisdiction. Federal statute 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9), the 'zipper clause,' divests federal courts of jurisdiction over any questions of law or fact 'arising from any action taken... to remove an alien' except through a petition for review of a final removal order. Because detention pending removal proceedings is an action taken to effectuate removal, any challenge to that detention 'arises from' the removal action. Therefore, the respondents' claims are jurisdictionally barred and should have been dismissed on that basis.
Dissenting - Justice Breyer
Yes. The statutes should be interpreted as requiring bail hearings for prolonged detention to avoid grave constitutional doubts under the Due Process Clause. The majority's reading of the statutes authorizes prolonged, arbitrary detention, which runs contrary to centuries of Anglo-American legal tradition recognizing a fundamental right to seek bail. The statutory terms 'detained' and 'in custody' are ambiguous and have historically been understood as consistent with release on bail, as a person on bail remains under legal restraint. Given the serious constitutional problem with mandatory, long-term detention without any individualized hearing, the Court should apply the canon of constitutional avoidance, as it did in Zadvydas. The majority's interpretation creates the anomaly that individuals whose right to remain in the U.S. is still being litigated are treated more harshly than those already ordered removed.
Analysis:
This decision significantly restricts the application of the canon of constitutional avoidance, clarifying that it cannot be used to rewrite a statute the Court deems textually clear. It solidifies the government's statutory authority to detain certain non-citizens for prolonged periods without providing bond hearings, effectively shifting the legal battleground from statutory interpretation to direct constitutional challenges. By remanding the constitutional question and raising doubts about the validity of the class action, the decision makes it more difficult for aliens to collectively challenge detention policies, forcing future claims to proceed on an individual basis and directly confront the constitutionality of the statutory scheme under the Due Process Clause.
