Jenkins v. Anderson
447 U.S. 231 (1980)
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Rule of Law:
The use of a defendant's pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as impeachment evidence when the defendant testifies at trial does not violate the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination or the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of fundamental fairness.
Facts:
- On August 12, 1974, Doyle Redding robbed the sister and boyfriend of petitioner Jenkins.
- Jenkins, who was nearby, followed Redding and reported his whereabouts to the police.
- The following day, Jenkins encountered Redding, who accused Jenkins of informing on him.
- According to Jenkins, Redding then attacked him with a knife, and during the ensuing struggle, Jenkins stabbed and killed Redding.
- Jenkins did not report the stabbing to the police or wait for them to arrive.
- Approximately two weeks after the killing, Jenkins turned himself in to the authorities.
- At his trial for murder, Jenkins took the stand and claimed that he had acted in self-defense.
Procedural Posture:
- Jenkins was tried for first-degree murder in a Michigan state trial court.
- A jury convicted Jenkins of the lesser-included offense of manslaughter.
- Jenkins appealed to the Michigan Court of Appeals, which affirmed the conviction.
- The Michigan Supreme Court, the state's highest court, denied leave to appeal.
- Jenkins filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan.
- The District Court denied the petition.
- Jenkins, as appellant, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which affirmed the District Court's decision.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Does the use of a criminal defendant's pre-arrest silence to impeach his credibility at trial violate the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Powell
No. The use of pre-arrest silence to impeach a defendant's credibility does not violate the Constitution. Regarding the Fifth Amendment, once a defendant voluntarily takes the witness stand, he is subject to cross-examination and impeachment like any other witness, and this includes questioning on prior silence, as established in Raffel v. United States. This practice advances the truth-finding function of the criminal trial. Regarding the Fourteenth Amendment, this situation is distinct from Doyle v. Ohio, where using post-arrest, post-Miranda silence for impeachment was found to be fundamentally unfair. The unfairness in Doyle stemmed from the government implicitly assuring the defendant that his silence would not be used against him via the Miranda warnings. In this case, Jenkins' silence was pre-arrest, and no governmental action induced him to remain silent, so the fundamental unfairness of Doyle is not present.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Marshall
Yes. Using pre-arrest silence for impeachment violates both the Due Process Clause and the privilege against self-incrimination. First, pre-arrest silence is not probative of credibility and is 'insolubly ambiguous'; an innocent person may remain silent for many reasons, such as fear or knowledge of their constitutional rights, making its use for impeachment fundamentally unfair. Second, it impermissibly burdens the Fifth Amendment privilege, as a defendant seeking to offer an exculpatory story would have to incriminate himself by admitting to the underlying act. Finally, it burdens the right to testify by forcing a defendant to choose between incriminating himself before arrest or having his subsequent trial testimony undermined by his earlier silence.
Concurring - Mr. Justice Stevens
No. The judgment should be affirmed, but for different reasons. The Fifth Amendment is simply irrelevant because it protects against compulsory self-incrimination, and a citizen's decision to remain silent before any contact with the police involves no official compulsion. Therefore, the admissibility of pre-arrest silence is a routine evidentiary question, not a constitutional one. The due process claim also fails, not because of the pre/post-Miranda distinction, but because it is generally fair to infer that silence, when not compelled, is not an assertion of a constitutional privilege.
Analysis:
This decision establishes a critical distinction in the law regarding a defendant's silence, creating a bright-line rule between pre-arrest and post-arrest silence. While Doyle v. Ohio protects a defendant's silence after receiving Miranda warnings, Jenkins v. Anderson allows prosecutors to use pre-arrest silence to challenge a defendant's credibility. This significantly impacts trial strategy, potentially pressuring an individual who may have a valid defense to report their version of events to law enforcement immediately, possibly without legal counsel, to avoid their silence being used against them later. The case highlights the tension between the state's interest in truth-finding and the individual's Fifth Amendment rights before formal custody begins.
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