Jeffrey Fairbanks v. State of Indiana
119 N.E.3d 564 (2019)
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Rule of Law:
Under Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b), the State may introduce evidence of a defendant's prior bad acts to prove lack of accident if it has a 'reliable assurance' that the defendant will raise an accident defense, even before the defendant affirmatively asserts that defense at trial.
Facts:
- On multiple occasions before May 28, 2015, Jeffrey Fairbanks's stepdaughters had seen him place a pillow over his three-month-old infant daughter Janna's face to muffle her crying.
- On the morning of May 28, 2015, while Janna was in Fairbanks's sole care, one of his stepdaughters heard Janna cry three times, with the last two cries sounding 'muffled'.
- Later that day, Janna died, and Fairbanks left the house with her body wrapped in a blanket.
- Fairbanks returned home and told the family that Janna was dead and that he had buried her in a cornfield.
- The next day, Fairbanks told police officers that he had actually disposed of Janna's body in a dumpster.
- Fairbanks admitted to police that on the morning of Janna's death, he had placed a pillow over her to 'muffle her' but claimed he removed it right away.
- In pre-trial statements to police and news media, Fairbanks suggested he might have accidentally rolled over on Janna in bed, specifically mentioning 'roll-over deaths' as a possibility.
- Janna's body was never found.
Procedural Posture:
- The State of Indiana charged Jeffrey Fairbanks in a state trial court with murder and felony neglect of a dependent resulting in death.
- Before trial, the State filed a notice of intent to use evidence of prior pillow incidents under Rule 404(b), and Fairbanks filed a motion in limine to exclude it.
- The trial court denied Fairbanks's motion, ruling the evidence was admissible to show 'lack of accident'.
- A jury acquitted Fairbanks of murder but found him guilty of felony neglect of a dependent resulting in death.
- Fairbanks appealed his conviction to the Indiana Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment.
- Fairbanks, as petitioner, sought transfer to the Supreme Court of Indiana, which the court granted.
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Issue:
Does Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b) permit the State to introduce evidence of a defendant's prior bad acts to show lack of accident before the defendant affirmatively raises an accident defense at trial, if the State has a 'reliable assurance' the defense will be raised?
Opinions:
Majority - Rush, Chief Justice
Yes, Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b) permits the State to introduce such evidence under these circumstances. The court reasoned that the 'lack of accident' exception to the prohibition on character evidence is a specialized application of the 'intent' exception. Citing its precedent in Wickizer v. State, which requires a defendant to place intent at issue before the State can introduce evidence of other bad acts, the court extended that logic. It held that because claiming an act was accidental is the same as claiming a lack of criminal intent, the same safeguards are needed to prevent the 'forbidden inference' of guilt based on propensity. Therefore, the State may introduce lack-of-accident evidence either after the defendant raises an accident defense at trial, or, as in this case, when the State has a 'reliable assurance' from the defendant's own pre-trial statements that such a defense will be raised. Fairbanks's statements to police and news outlets about a possible 'roll-over death' provided this reliable assurance, making the prior pillow incidents admissible.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the timing and prerequisites for using the 'lack of accident' exception under Indiana's Rule 404(b). By formally linking the 'lack of accident' exception to the more developed jurisprudence on the 'intent' exception, the court provides a clear framework for trial courts. The ruling creates a significant tool for prosecutors, allowing them to preemptively rebut an anticipated accident defense in their case-in-chief, provided they can point to reliable indicators, like a defendant's own statements, that the defense is forthcoming. This prevents defendants from ambushing the State with an accident defense late in the trial after the State might have rested its case.
