Jean Bernard Gelin v. U.S. Attorney General
837 F.3d 1236, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 17296, 2016 WL 5219863 (2016)
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Rule of Law:
A conviction under a statute that requires a knowing or willful act directed at a manifestly vulnerable victim, such as an elderly or disabled person, categorically constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) for immigration purposes, even if the least culpable conduct does not require proof of actual physical injury.
Facts:
- In March 1992, Jean Bernard Gelin, a citizen of Haiti, entered the United States without legal authorization.
- In 2002, Gelin pled guilty in a Florida court to one count of abuse of an elderly person or disabled adult, specifically Daniel Rodriguez.
- The abuse Gelin committed did not cause great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement to the victim.
- Gelin's application for Temporary Protected Status was denied by the Department of Homeland Security due to his 2002 felony conviction.
Procedural Posture:
- The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated removal proceedings against Jean Bernard Gelin in an immigration court.
- Gelin conceded removability on the grounds of being illegally present but applied for cancellation of removal, a form of discretionary relief.
- The Immigration Judge (IJ), acting as the trial court, found Gelin ineligible for relief, ruling his Florida conviction was a categorical CIMT, and ordered him removed.
- Gelin, as appellant, appealed the IJ's decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), an intermediate appellate body.
- The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision, dismissing Gelin's appeal.
- Gelin then petitioned the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit for review of the BIA's final order of removal.
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Issue:
Does a conviction for abuse of an elderly person or disabled adult under Florida Statute § 825.102(1) categorically constitute a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT), rendering an alien ineligible for cancellation of removal?
Opinions:
Majority - Hull, Circuit Judge
Yes, a conviction for abuse of an elderly person or disabled adult under Florida Statute § 825.102(1) categorically constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude. The court, applying the categorical approach, examined the least culpable conduct proscribed by the statute: knowingly or willfully encouraging an act that could reasonably be expected to result in injury to a vulnerable person. The court found this to be a CIMT for two primary reasons. First, the required mental state ('knowing or willful') is more culpable than mere recklessness, which this court has previously found sufficient for a CIMT in cases like Keungne. Second, the crime specifically targets victims who are manifestly vulnerable (elderly or disabled), which makes the act inherently one of 'baseness, vileness, or depravity.' The combination of a culpable mental state and the targeting of a vulnerable victim class makes the offense morally turpitudinous, even without proof of actual harm.
Dissenting - Martin, Circuit Judge
No, a conviction under Florida Statute § 825.102(1) does not categorically constitute a crime involving moral turpitude. The least culpable conduct criminalized by the statute does not rise to the level of moral turpitude. A person can be convicted under the statute for an intentional act committed with mere recklessness ('conscious disregard of the likelihood of injury'), without intending to cause injury. Furthermore, the statute does not require the defendant to have knowledge of the victim's status as elderly or disabled, and it does not require that any actual injury occur. A conviction based on reckless conduct, without intent to injure a victim whose vulnerable status is unknown to the defendant, does not meet the 'nebulous concept' of moral turpitude.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies that, within the Eleventh Circuit, crimes targeting manifestly vulnerable populations carry significant weight in the CIMT analysis for immigration law. It establishes that the combination of a culpable mental state (knowing or willful) and the victim's vulnerable status is sufficient to render an offense a CIMT, even if the statute's least culpable conduct does not require intent to injure or actual injury. This precedent makes it significantly more difficult for non-citizens convicted under similar statutes protecting vulnerable groups to obtain discretionary relief from removal, as the offense is now categorically disqualifying.
