Jean-Baptiste Bado v. US (en banc)
186 A.3d 1243 (2018)
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Rule of Law:
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a right to a jury trial for an accused noncitizen who faces the penalty of deportation in conjunction with a maximum period of incarceration that does not exceed six months, as such a combined penalty overcomes the presumption that the offense is petty.
Facts:
- Jean-Baptiste Bado came to the United States on February 8, 2005, from Burkina Faso, where he was a pastor, fleeing prosecution and torture for his political and religious beliefs.
- Bado filed an application for asylum in the United States.
- In 2011, Bado was charged by information with three counts of misdemeanor sexual abuse of a minor.
- If convicted, U.S. immigration law would bar Bado from receiving political asylum and lead to his removal from the United States.
- Bado pleaded not guilty to the charges and demanded a jury trial.
- At his trial, Bado took the stand and contradicted the charges, calling into question the complainant's credibility.
- Bado was acquitted of two of the charges but convicted of one count of misdemeanor sexual abuse of a minor.
- Bado was sentenced to 180 days, ordered to pay $50 to the Crime Victims Compensation Program Fund, and required to register as a sex offender for ten years.
Procedural Posture:
- Jean-Baptiste Bado was charged by information with three counts of misdemeanor sexual abuse of a minor in a trial court (Superior Court of the District of Columbia).
- Bado demanded a jury trial, which the trial court denied.
- Following a bench trial, Bado was acquitted of two counts but convicted of one.
- Bado appealed his conviction to a panel of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which reversed his conviction, finding his right to a jury trial was violated.
- The government filed a petition for rehearing en banc with the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which was granted, and the division's opinions were vacated.
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Issue:
Does the Sixth Amendment guarantee a right to a jury trial to an accused who faces the penalty of removal/deportation as a result of a criminal conviction for an offense punishable by incarceration for up to 180 days?
Opinions:
Majority - Ruiz, Senior Judge
Yes, the Sixth Amendment guarantees a right to a jury trial to an accused noncitizen who faces the penalty of removal/deportation as a result of a criminal conviction for an offense punishable by incarceration for up to 180 days. Applying the Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas test, which considers an offense with a maximum incarceration of six months or less presumptively "petty" but allows this presumption to be rebutted by severe additional statutory penalties, the court finds that deportation is a "particularly severe 'penalty'" that overcomes this presumption. The court emphasizes that deportation is akin to "banishment" and, as recognized by the Supreme Court in Padilla v. Kentucky, is an "integral part—indeed, sometimes the most important part—of the penalty" for noncitizen defendants. The court rejects the government's arguments that deportation is a mere civil sanction, not a penalty for a criminal offense, or that it should be disregarded because it is imposed by Congress rather than the local District of Columbia legislature. The Blanton analysis focuses on the severity of the penalties faced by the accused, regardless of the specific legislative body imposing them, and Congress's linkage of certain crimes to deportation clearly reflects a societal judgment of their seriousness. The practicalities of applying this standard do not outweigh the constitutional right to a jury trial.
Concurring - Washington, Senior Judge
Senior Judge Washington concurs with the judgment, acknowledging the decision faithfully applies Blanton, but expresses concern over the disparity in jury trial rights created between citizens and noncitizens for the same misdemeanor offense. He notes that the D.C. Misdemeanor Streamlining Act, designed to reduce court calendars by reducing maximum sentences to 180 days or less, effectively made most misdemeanors non-jury-demandable for citizens. He suggests that the D.C. Council should either clarify its legislative intent regarding whether civil penalties, like deportation, reflect a determination of an offense's seriousness, or reconsider its policy to prioritize judicial economy over the right to a jury trial by restoring jury trials for all misdemeanors. He believes this would enhance public trust in the courts.
Concurring - Thompson, Associate Judge
Associate Judge Thompson concurs in the judgment but offers a narrower rationale. He agrees that deportation is a severe statutory penalty as described in Padilla. However, he argues that Congress's broad categorization of "deportable" offenses does not clearly reflect a legislative determination that all such offenses are "serious" for Sixth Amendment purposes, pointing to provisions for cancellation of removal for some crimes. He posits that the legislative intent to deem an offense "serious" is only clearly reflected when Congress has eliminated all avenues of relief from removal, which is the case for offenses classified as "aggravated felonies." Since Jean-Baptiste Bado's conviction for misdemeanor sexual abuse of a minor is an "aggravated felony" under federal immigration law, and such a conviction makes removal virtually inevitable and bars asylum, it clearly signals Congress's intent that such an offense is serious. This narrower approach provides a clearer line for application and avoids broadly extending jury trial rights based on all deportable offenses.
Dissenting - Glickman, Associate Judge
No, the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee a jury trial to an accused who faces the penalty of removal/deportation as a result of a criminal conviction for an offense punishable by incarceration for up to 180 days. Judge Glickman dissents, arguing that the Blanton test requires determining the seriousness of an offense based on the penalties imposed by the legislature that enacted the offense. Here, the D.C. Council enacted the misdemeanor sexual abuse of a minor offense, prescribing a maximum of 180 days in prison and a $1,000 fine, which are not severe enough to trigger a jury trial right. The penalty of deportation, however, is imposed by federal immigration law (Congress), not the D.C. Council, and therefore should not be considered in evaluating the seriousness of the D.C. offense for Sixth Amendment purposes. He further notes that the D.C. Sex Offender Registration Act requirement is not punitive and does not transform the offense into a jury-demandable one.
Dissenting - Fisher, Associate Judge
No, the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee a jury trial to an accused who faces the penalty of removal/deportation as a result of a criminal conviction for an offense punishable by incarceration for up to 180 days. Judge Fisher dissents, stating that Blanton requires focusing on the seriousness of the offense as determined by the enacting legislature, not the varying individual circumstances or collateral consequences a defendant might face. He argues that Padilla v. Kentucky (ineffective assistance of counsel) does not apply to the jury trial right, and that deportation, while severe, is not a "criminal sanction" nor is it within the power of the trial judge to impose. Crucially, he asserts that Blanton requires consideration of penalties imposed by the same legislature that created the offense. Since the D.C. Council's penalties for misdemeanor sexual abuse of a minor are not severe enough to require a jury trial, the federal consequence of deportation, imposed by Congress, should not alter this determination. He warns that the majority's approach would unduly complicate criminal law practice by potentially requiring jury trials for other offenses based on diverse collateral consequences like loss of professional licenses or public housing.
Analysis:
This case significantly expands the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial for noncitizen defendants, connecting it to severe immigration consequences like deportation rather than solely the direct criminal penalties imposed by the jurisdiction enacting the criminal statute. It clarifies that such severe "collateral" penalties, even if imposed by a different legislative body (Congress vs. D.C. Council), can overcome the presumption that an offense is "petty" under the Blanton test. This ruling could lead to a two-tiered system of jury trial rights, where noncitizens receive different rights than citizens for the same offense. Future cases will likely explore the boundaries of this decision, particularly whether other severe statutory or civil penalties that disproportionately affect certain defendants could also trigger a jury trial right.
