Javier Castrijon-Garcia v. Eric Holder, Jr.
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 523, 704 F.3d 1205, 2013 WL 85971 (2013)
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Rule of Law:
A conviction for simple kidnapping under California Penal Code § 207(a) is not a categorical crime involving moral turpitude under immigration law because the statute does not require an intent to injure, actual injury, or a special class of victims, and California courts have applied it to conduct not inherently morally turpitudinous.
Facts:
- Javier Castrijon-Garcia ('Castrijon'), a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the United States without inspection in 1989.
- Castrijon has resided continuously in the United States since 1989, making only two short trips to Mexico in 1998 and 2003.
- Castrijon has three U.S. citizen children, U.S. citizen sisters, and his mother is a legal permanent resident.
- In 1992, Castrijon pled guilty to attempted kidnapping in violation of California Penal Code §§ 664 and 207(a), receiving a suspended sentence of 300 days in jail and 36 months of probation.
- During an immigration hearing, Castrijon explained that the attempted kidnapping incident occurred while he was with friends and that he did not know the victim.
- Castrijon was also convicted of driving with a suspended license in 2002 and 2005.
Procedural Posture:
- The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) charged Javier Castrijon-Garcia with removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) for being an alien present without admission or parole.
- Castrijon conceded removability, designated Mexico as his country of removal, and submitted an application for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b).
- An Immigration Judge (IJ) issued an oral decision finding Castrijon ineligible for cancellation of removal, concluding that his conviction for attempted simple kidnapping was a categorical crime involving moral turpitude.
- The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision in an unpublished ruling.
- Castrijon petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for review of the BIA's decision.
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Issue:
Does a conviction for simple kidnapping under California Penal Code § 207(a) constitute a categorical crime involving moral turpitude, thereby making an individual statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal?
Opinions:
Majority - Reinhardt, Circuit Judge
No, a conviction for simple kidnapping under California Penal Code § 207(a) does not constitute a categorical crime involving moral turpitude, and thus Castrijon is not automatically statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal on that basis. The court first determined that the BIA's unpublished decision was not entitled to Chevron deference because the cited cases did not interpret the identical statute (CPC § 207(a)). It also declined Skidmore deference, finding the BIA's reasoning unpersuasive and conclusory, relying on state evidentiary law (which serves a different purpose than immigration law) without adequate analysis of the statute's elements. Applying the categorical approach, the court held that CPC § 207(a) does not require an intent to injure, actual injury, or a special class of victims, which are typically elements of non-fraudulent crimes involving moral turpitude (citing Nunez v. Holder). Simple kidnapping under CPC § 207(a) is a general intent crime, meaning the defendant does not need to intend to instill fear in the victim, and the 'purpose or motive of the taking and carrying away is immaterial' when the victim can consent (People v. Oliver; People v. Moya). Furthermore, California courts have applied CPC § 207(a) to conduct that is not 'truly unconscionable' or 'base, vile, and depraved,' such as students pushing university administrators during a protest (People v. Apo) or an uncle assisting a father in retrieving a runaway niece (People v. Garibay). The court emphasized that not all serious crimes or crimes of violence are automatically crimes involving moral turpitude, especially if they lack the requisite 'evil intent.' Because CPC § 207(a) is overbroad and not limited to conduct that constitutes a crime of moral turpitude, the court remanded the case to the BIA to apply the modified categorical approach to Castrijon’s specific conviction.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the distinction between serious crimes, crimes of violence, and crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMT) in the immigration context, particularly for 'general intent' offenses. It limits the BIA's ability to rely on boilerplate language or state evidentiary interpretations of moral turpitude for immigration purposes, emphasizing the need for a thorough analysis of statutory elements and a realistic probability of non-turpitudinous application. The ruling strengthens the requirement for 'evil intent' or specific harm for a non-fraudulent offense to be a CIMT, potentially making it harder for the government to remove individuals based on older, less severe interpretations of crimes.
