Jasperson v. Scharnikow
1907 U.S. App. LEXIS 4122, 15 L.R.A.N.S. 1178, 150 F. 571 (1907)
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Rule of Law:
To acquire title by adverse possession, the claimant's entry upon the land must be made under a good faith 'claim of right' or 'color of title.' An entry by a person who knows the land belongs to another constitutes a mere trespass and cannot ripen into title, regardless of the duration of possession.
Facts:
- The defendants in error (Higgins) held title to a quarter section of land under a United States patent issued in 1878.
- The Higginses resided in Montana and paid all taxes assessed on the Washington property since its acquisition.
- In 1888, Uriah M. Bryant entered the land, which he found vacant and unoccupied, with the initial intent to claim it as a homestead.
- Shortly after his entry, Bryant checked courthouse records and discovered that the land had been patented to Higgins.
- Despite knowing Higgins was the true owner, Bryant continued to occupy the land until his death in 1897.
- During his occupation, Bryant built a cabin and barn, posted 'no trespass' signs, cut and sold timber, and the property became known as the 'Bryant Place.'
- Bryant and his successors in interest never paid any taxes on the property.
- In 1898, after Bryant’s death, the plaintiffs in error (Siepmann) purchased whatever interest Bryant had in the property from his heirs via a quitclaim deed.
Procedural Posture:
- The defendants in error (Higgins) filed an action for ejectment against the plaintiffs in error (Siepmann et al.) in a federal trial court to recover possession of the land.
- The case was tried before a jury.
- At the close of evidence, the trial court judge instructed the jury to return a verdict in favor of the Higginses on the issue of possession.
- The trial court only submitted the question of the amount of damages to the jury.
- Siepmann et al., as plaintiffs in error, appealed the trial court's judgment to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does a person who enters and occupies land, knowing it is patented to another, establish the 'claim of right' necessary to acquire title by adverse possession?
Opinions:
Majority - Gilbert, J.
No. A person who knowingly enters another's land without any bona fide belief that they have a right to it cannot establish a 'claim of right' for adverse possession. Such an entry is a mere trespass, not a hostile ouster of the true owner. The court reasoned that adverse possession requires more than just physical occupation; it requires an entry made with the intention to oust the true owner based on a belief of right. Bryant knew the land belonged to Higgins, so his entry was not made under a claim of right but as a 'squatter' and 'trespasser.' Citing Washington state precedent and the U.S. Supreme Court case Ewing v. Burnett, the court emphasized that 'the intention guides the entry and fixes its character.' Since Bryant's intention was not based on a belief of ownership but on a desire to occupy land he knew was not his, his possession was not adverse in the legal sense and could not ripen into title. The court characterized the attempt to gain title this way as an 'idea of acquiring title by larceny.'
Analysis:
This case clarifies the 'claim of right' element of adverse possession, emphasizing that a claimant's subjective good faith is critical at the time of entry. It distinguishes a legally 'hostile' possession based on a mistaken belief of ownership from a simple trespass by a knowing 'squatter.' The decision solidifies the principle that one cannot knowingly steal land through prolonged occupation, thereby protecting landowners from bad-faith possessors. This precedent makes it significantly more difficult for claimants who are aware of the true owner's title to succeed in an adverse possession action, as it requires them to prove a bona fide belief in their right to the property at the inception of their possession.
