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Jarrett v. Jones

Supreme Court of Missouri
258 S.W.3d 442 (2008)
ELI5:

Rule of Law:

A plaintiff who is a direct participant in a negligent event (a 'direct victim') may recover for emotional distress resulting from that event, including distress from witnessing injury or death to a third party, without being subject to the more restrictive 'zone of danger' test required for bystander recovery.


Facts:

  • On June 8, 2004, Michael Jones was driving with his family when he lost control of his car on a wet highway.
  • Jones's car spun across the median and collided with a tractor-trailer driven by Tommy Jarrett, a professional truck driver.
  • The collision caused Jarrett to suffer minor physical injuries when his knees hit the steering wheel and dashboard.
  • Immediately after the collision, Jarrett got out of his truck to check on the occupants of Jones's car.
  • Upon reaching the car, Jarrett saw Jones and his wife badly injured, and he viewed the body of Jones's two-year-old daughter, Makayla, who was killed in the collision.
  • As a result of the incident, particularly viewing the deceased child, Jarrett developed severe emotional distress, including post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).

Procedural Posture:

  • Tommy R. Jarrett and his wife, Beverly Jarrett, sued Michael B. Jones in trial court for negligence.
  • Mr. Jones filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing the Jarretts could not recover for emotional distress under the bystander theory.
  • The Jarretts admitted that Mr. Jarrett's emotional distress was caused by viewing the body of Mr. Jones's deceased daughter.
  • The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Mr. Jones, finding that Mr. Jarrett was not in the 'zone of danger' when he viewed the child's body and therefore could not recover as a bystander.
  • The Jarretts appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the Missouri Supreme Court.

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Issue:

Does the more restrictive 'zone of danger' test for bystander recovery apply to a plaintiff who was a direct participant in the negligent event that caused their emotional distress, even if the distress stems from observing the death of a third party involved in the same event?


Opinions:

Majority - Patricia Breckenridge

No, the more restrictive 'zone of danger' test for bystander recovery does not apply to a plaintiff who was a direct participant in the negligent event. The court held that a person directly involved in an accident is a 'direct victim,' and any emotional distress resulting from the entire traumatic event, including witnessing harm to others, is recoverable under the less stringent standard for direct victims. The court reasoned that bystander rules were created to address claims from those not physically involved in the accident, and the policy concerns about fraudulent claims are not present when the plaintiff is a direct victim. Furthermore, a direct victim's emotional distress from their role in the event and from witnessing another's suffering is practically inseparable, making a single, more lenient standard appropriate. Mr. Jarrett was not a passive witness; his direct involvement in the collision that led to the child's death was central to his trauma, making him a direct victim entitled to pursue damages for emotional distress under the standard established in Bass v. Nooney Co.


Dissenting - Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr.

Yes, the more restrictive 'zone of danger' test for bystander recovery should apply. The dissent argued that the majority misapplied precedent and that the 'zone of danger' test from Asaro v. Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hospital applies to all cases where emotional distress results solely from observing injury to a third person. The dissent contended that the accident was a separate event from Jarrett's subsequent viewing of the child's body. By the time Jarrett got out of his truck, the accident was over, and he was no longer in personal peril, thus becoming a bystander. Jarrett himself admitted his distress was caused solely by viewing the body, not from the collision itself, which makes the events separable. Applying a different standard creates incongruous results where a stranger involved in a crash can recover for emotional distress while a family member who was not in the 'zone of danger' (like the mother in Asaro) cannot.



Analysis:

This decision significantly clarifies the distinction between 'direct victim' and 'bystander' claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress in Missouri. It establishes that participation in a negligent event, regardless of the severity of one's own physical injuries, confers 'direct victim' status. This prevents defendants from defeating a claim by arguing the emotional distress arose from witnessing another's harm rather than fear for one's own safety. The ruling broadens the potential for recovery for plaintiffs involved in multi-casualty accidents, as they will not be held to the stricter 'zone of danger' standard that applies to uninvolved witnesses. It focuses the legal inquiry on the plaintiff's involvement in the event itself, rather than trying to parse the psychological sources of their trauma after the fact.

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