Yes, it's against the First Amendment. Making someone pay for speech they don't agree with is like forcing them to speak. The old court case that allowed this, called Abood, was wrong. The government's reasons for these fees, like keeping 'peace' with unions or stopping 'free riders,' aren't strong enough to take away someone's free speech rights. From now on, you can't take union fees from a worker's paycheck unless they specifically agree to it.

No, it shouldn't be against the First Amendment. For over 40 years, the Abood case set a reasonable rule. It let states decide that unions need these fees to do their job of representing all workers, which helps the government run smoothly. Taking away these fees is a huge change that messes up laws in over 20 states and thousands of contracts. The court is overstepping its bounds and making a big policy decision that should be left to the people and their elected officials.

The Supreme Court decided that it's unconstitutional for unions to take fees from public employees who aren't union members without their permission. I said this violates the nonmembers' free speech rights by forcing them to support the union's ideas on important public issues. The decision overturned a previous case called Abood, because I found that Abood was not well-reasoned, caused problems, and didn't fit with other decisions on free speech rights. I said free speech is very important, including the right not to speak. But I decided we shouldn't keep following Abood just because it was a previous decision, since it was flawed and has been weakened by more recent cases. A lot has changed since Abood, and the unions' interests in keeping the fees aren't enough to justify continuing to violate nonmembers' rights.

I disagree with the decision because it breaks a rule that has helped keep things fair in the public workplace. For a long time, workers paid a fee only to cover the costs of negotiating their job conditions, and that system worked well because it meant no one was forced to pay for union politics they didn’t support. Changing this rule now endangers that balance, and it could make work settings less predictable and fair.

I don’t agree with the decision because for a very long time we had a rule that let unions get enough money to do their job without forcing workers to pay for political messages they don’t believe in. This rule worked well because it made sure everyone paid only for things related to job negotiations. Changing that now could cause major problems, and it upsets the fairness and predictability that everyone has come to rely on.

—the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment barred "States and public-sector unions" from "extract [ing] agency fees from nonconsenting employees."

Janus held that agency fees "violate [] the free speech rights of nonmembers by compelling them to subsidize private speech on matters of substantial public concern."

… trial court explained that Janus held that " `States and public sector unions may no longer extract agency fees from nonconsenting employees'"and that" `[n] either an agency fee nor any other payment to the union may be deducted from a non-member's wages, nor may any other attempt be made to collect such a payment, unless the employee affirmatively consents to …

The Supreme Court held that requiring non-members to pay agency fees to public-sector unions violated the First Amendment.

The high Court has "identified several factors to consider in deciding whether to overrule a past decision, including `the quality of [its] reasoning, the workability of the rule it established, its consistency with other related decisions,... and reliance on the decision.'"

The First Amendment "forbids abridgement of the freedom of speech," and "freedom of speech includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all."

"Stare decisis is the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process."

There, Janus, a child support specialist employed by the Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services, refused to join the union that represented his bargaining unit, the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31 (AFSCME), because he opposed many of the public policy positions it advocated, including its positions in …

—recognizing that "gender identity" is a "sensitive political topic []" that is "undoubtedly [a] matter [] of profound value and concern to the public

—assuming that a lack of Article III standing cannot be cured by an intervenor's standing but holding that a district court may nonetheless treat an intervenor's complaint as the operative complaint in a new lawsuit

Yes, a state law that requires public employees to pay an 'agency fee' to a union violates the First Amendment. Compelling non-members to subsidize private speech they may disagree with, even speech related to collective bargaining, is a form of coerced speech that fails to survive exacting First Amendment scrutiny. The prior precedent of Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed. is overruled because its justifications—promoting labor peace and preventing free riders—are not compelling interests that can overcome the First Amendment rights of employees. Furthermore, Abood was poorly reasoned, its test distinguishing between chargeable and non-chargeable expenses has proven unworkable, and subsequent legal and factual developments have eroded its foundation.

No, a state law that requires public employees to pay an 'agency fee' does not violate the First Amendment. The 41-year-old precedent of Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed. correctly balanced the First Amendment rights of employees against the government's strong interest in promoting labor peace and efficient public services through stable collective bargaining. The government's decision to allow agency fees to prevent free-riding and ensure an effective bargaining partner is a reasonable workplace regulation that should be upheld under deferential First Amendment standards for public employee speech. Overruling Abood disregards powerful stare decisis principles, upends the massive reliance interests of over 20 states and millions of workers, and improperly uses the First Amendment to settle a policy debate.

The Supreme Court held that the practice of extracting agency fees from nonconsenting employees is unconstitutional. I found that such fees violate the free speech rights of nonmembers by compelling them to subsidize private speech on matters of substantial public concern. The decision overruled the Court's past decision in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, considering factors such as the quality of its reasoning, workability, consistency with other decisions, and reliance on the decision. I emphasized the importance of freedom of speech, which includes the right to refrain from speaking, and the principle of stare decisis. However, I concluded that stare decisis does not require retaining Abood because it was poorly reasoned, has led to practical problems and abuse, is inconsistent with other First Amendment cases, and has been undermined by more recent decisions. Developments since Abood was handed down have shed new light on the issue of agency fees, and no reliance interests on the part of public-sector unions are sufficient to justify the perpetuation of the free speech violations that Abood has countenanced for the past 41 years.

I dissent from today’s majority opinion because it departs from a long-established balance that has protected both public employees’ First Amendment rights and the legitimate state interest in maintaining effective collective bargaining. For decades, the Abood framework has ensured that nonmember fees are confined to covering only those costs directly associated with collective bargaining, thereby preventing forced support for a union’s political activities. I am troubled because the majority now overruling Abood upends reliance interests and undermines the stability of public labor relations, which have functioned well because they provided a clear and workable rule that distributed union costs fairly. This departure not only ignores the longstanding rationale but also places at risk the administrative certainty that has guided our approach for many years.

I dissent because the majority’s decision, which overrules Abood, improperly discards a well-established precedent that has struck the proper balance between public employees’ free speech rights and the state’s compelling interest in maintaining a stable, effective union. Abood clearly distinguished between union expenditures for collective bargaining and those for political activities, and this separation has worked because it prevented the forced subsidization of controversial speech. I believe the majority misapplies the First Amendment by ignoring the reliance interests developed over decades; governments and unions have structured their relationships based on this rule because it worked reliably, and to abandon it now is to disrupt expectations and the careful allocation of costs that has been in place because of sound rationale.

Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees

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