Janice M. v. Margaret K.
404 Md. 661, 948 A.2d 73, 2008 Md. LEXIS 255 (2008)
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Rule of Law:
Maryland does not recognize 'de facto parent' status as an exception to the requirement that a third party seeking custody or visitation over the objection of a fit legal parent must first demonstrate either parental unfitness or the existence of exceptional circumstances.
Facts:
- Janice M. and Margaret K. were in a committed same-sex relationship for approximately eighteen years.
- Janice M. desired to be a mother and, after discussing it with Margaret K., pursued adoption in India.
- In December 1999, Janice M. legally adopted a child, Maya. Margaret K. never adopted Maya.
- From Maya's arrival in 1999 until the couple's separation in the summer of 2004, Maya lived with both women.
- During this time, Janice M. and Margaret K. shared most parental duties, including preparing food, bathing, schooling, and addressing healthcare needs for Maya.
- After the separation, Janice M. first permitted, then placed increasing restrictions on, Margaret K.'s visitation with Maya.
- In January 2005, following a letter from Margaret K.'s attorney regarding visitation, Janice M. denied Margaret K. all further visitation and access to Maya.
Procedural Posture:
- Margaret K. filed a complaint against Janice M. in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County (trial court) seeking custody or, alternatively, visitation with Maya.
- The Circuit Court granted Janice M.'s motion for judgment on the issue of custody, finding no exceptional circumstances existed.
- The Circuit Court then found that Margaret K. was a 'de facto parent' and, on that basis, granted her visitation under the 'best interests of the child' standard.
- Janice M. appealed the visitation order to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland (intermediate appellate court), where she was the appellant and Margaret K. was the appellee.
- The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, upholding the de facto parent doctrine as an exception to the exceptional circumstances requirement for visitation.
- The Court of Appeals of Maryland (this court) granted both Janice M.'s petition and Margaret K.'s cross-petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision.
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Issue:
Does Maryland recognize 'de facto parent' status, thereby allowing a court to grant a third party visitation or custody rights over the objection of a fit legal parent based on the 'best interests of the child' standard without first requiring a showing of parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances?
Opinions:
Majority - Bell, Chief Judge
No. Maryland does not recognize de facto parent status as a means to bypass the established legal standard for third-party visitation. A third party, regardless of their relationship with the child, must first prove either parental unfitness or the existence of exceptional circumstances before a court may consider the best interests of the child. The court reasoned that fit legal parents have a fundamental constitutional right under the Due Process Clause to the care, custody, and control of their children, as established in Troxel v. Granville. Maryland precedent, specifically McDermott v. Dougherty and Koshko v. Haining, firmly establishes a two-step analysis where the court only reaches the 'best interest' standard after a threshold showing of parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances that could result in serious detriment to the child. The court held that visitation is a 'species of custody' and thus intrudes upon parental rights, requiring the same stringent test. Consequently, the intermediate appellate court's holding in S.F. v. M.D., which created an exception for de facto parents, is explicitly overruled as inconsistent with this controlling precedent. While factors establishing a parent-like relationship can be evidence toward a finding of exceptional circumstances, they are not, as a matter of law, sufficient to replace that required finding.
Dissenting - Raker, Judge
Yes. A person who qualifies as a de facto parent should be treated as the equivalent of a legal parent for visitation purposes, allowing the court to decide the matter based on the best interest of the child without first needing to find exceptional circumstances. The dissent argues that the concept of family has evolved and the law must recognize relationships beyond strict biological or adoptive ties. A de facto parent, whose parental role was fostered and consented to by the legal parent, is fundamentally different from other third parties. The four-part test for de facto parenthood is a high bar that prevents a 'floodgate' of litigation. The Supreme Court's decision in Troxel did not prohibit states from recognizing such relationships, and this court's precedents in McDermott and Koshko dealt with 'pure third parties,' not individuals who functioned as parents. Therefore, once de facto parent status is established, that party should stand in parity with the legal parent, and the dispute should be resolved by applying the best interests of the child standard.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the constitutional primacy of a fit legal parent's rights in Maryland, rejecting the creation of a special category for 'de facto parents.' It clarifies that all non-legal parents, regardless of the nature of their relationship with a child, are considered third parties and must meet the high threshold of proving 'exceptional circumstances' to gain visitation or custody against a legal parent's wishes. This ruling raises a significant barrier for non-biological parents in non-traditional family structures, such as same-sex couples or stepparents, by preventing them from seeking visitation based solely on a 'best interests of the child' standard. The case overrules prior intermediate appellate court precedent and aligns third-party visitation standards squarely with third-party custody standards.
