No, a person cannot use the 'assumption of risk' defense for an intentional act like battery. The court explained that 'assumption of risk' is a defense for accidents (negligence), not for when you intentionally harm someone. For example, you 'assume the risk' of getting tackled when you play football, but you don't 'assume the risk' of a player deciding to punch you on purpose. Because Janelsins intentionally kicked Button, he can't use the excuse that Button knew he was drunk and might be violent. The law treats intentional harm much more seriously than accidental harm.

Yes, the drunk person (Janelsins) really did mean to hit the bar worker (Button), and no, he can't defend himself by saying Button should have known it might happen. I agree with the lower court's decision because Janelsins was yelling threats and moving around wildly, which shows he meant to hit Button. Even though Janelsins was drunk, being drunk doesn't mean you can't be responsible for hitting someone on purpose. The court that first looked at this case decided that Button didn't agree to be hit, and I think they were right. As for Janelsins saying Button should have known he might get hurt, that's not a good excuse when someone hurts you on purpose. Other courts have said the same thing. We want to stop people from hurting others on purpose, so we can't let them off the hook just because the other person knew they might get hurt. Lastly, about Button wanting extra punishment money, the first court was allowed to decide not to give that, even if they could have.

No, the doctrine of assumption of risk does not bar a plaintiff's recovery for civil battery. The court holds that while the defenses of consent and assumption of risk are conceptually similar, assumption of risk is a defense applicable to negligence actions, not intentional torts. The court reasons that public policy dictates deterring and punishing intentional wrongdoing, which is a graver wrong than negligence. Allowing a defendant to escape liability for an intentional act by claiming the plaintiff 'assumed the risk' would undermine this policy. The court aligns this holding with the overwhelming majority of other jurisdictions and draws an analogy to the rule that contributory negligence is also not a defense to intentional torts like battery.

Yes, the evidence was legally sufficient to find that Janelsins committed a civil battery upon Button, and the doctrine of assumption of risk does not apply as a defense in civil battery actions. I affirm the trial court's judgment because the evidence, including Janelsins's threats and flailing about, adequately supports a finding that he intended to strike Button. Although Janelsins was inebriated at the time of the incident, his voluntary intoxication does not vitiate the intent element of battery. The defense of consent was properly resolved by the trier of fact, who implicitly found an absence of consent. Regarding assumption of risk, I hold that it is not a viable defense in an action for civil battery. The distinctions between the doctrines of assumption of risk and consent are only semantic, and assumption of risk is more typically applied in negligence actions while consent is applied in intentional tort actions. Other jurisdictions have overwhelmingly rejected the applicability of assumption of risk to intentional torts. Public policy of deterring and punishing intentional wrongdoing dictates that a plaintiff cannot absolve a defendant of liability for such acts by assuming the risk that they will occur. As for Button's cross-appeal on punitive damages, I find no error in the trial court's decision to deny them, as the trier of fact has the discretion to deny punitive damages even where the record would otherwise support such an award.

Janelsins v. Button

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Rule of Law:

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Majority - Hollander, J.

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