James v. Skinner
1985 Fla. App. LEXIS 14259, 464 So.2d 588, 10 Fla. L. Weekly 360 (1985)
Rule of Law:
In Florida, to obtain summary judgment in a negligence action involving straying livestock, the moving party must conclusively prove the absence of negligence; if the facts are susceptible to a reasonable inference that the livestock owner's method of securing the animals was insufficient, a genuine issue of material fact exists for jury consideration.
Facts:
- On December 17, 1982, in the early morning darkness, John James was injured while driving his automobile on a highway.
- John James's automobile struck two of Edwin Skinner's horses, which had escaped from a nearby pasture.
- Edwin Skinner testified that he had secured the gate to the pasture around 10:00 p.m. the night before the accident.
- Upon investigation after the accident, Edwin Skinner found the gate open.
- The gate was secured by a chain which was hooked over a nail in the gate post.
- Edwin Skinner had bent the nail slightly down and in toward the direction of the gate to make it possible to get the chain over it.
- Even after the nail had been bent, it remained difficult to stretch the chain over it.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiffs John and Karen James filed a negligence action for damages against defendant Edwin Skinner.
- Edwin Skinner denied any negligence on his part and moved for summary judgment.
- The trial court reviewed the pleadings and depositions, then granted Edwin Skinner’s motion and entered final summary judgment in his favor.
- John and Karen James appealed the final summary judgment order.
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Issue:
Does a genuine issue of material fact exist regarding a defendant's negligence in maintaining a secure enclosure for livestock, thereby precluding summary judgment, when the defendant's horses escaped from a pasture through a gate secured by a chain hooked over a nail that was difficult to latch?
Opinions:
Majority - PER CURIAM
Yes, a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding Edwin Skinner's negligence in securing his livestock, precluding summary judgment. The court found that Edwin Skinner did not meet the burden of conclusively proving he had not negligently permitted his livestock to stray on public roads, as required by § 588.15, Fla.Stat. and the precedent of Visingardi v. Tirone. The court distinguished Lee v. Hinson, where a gate was secured by a snap lock only operable by human hands, noting that in the present case, the facts are susceptible to the inference that the chain could have been brushed over the head of the nail by one of the horses, thereby creating a question for a jury. Therefore, the summary judgment was reversed and the case remanded for trial.
Dissenting - SCHOONOVER, Judge
No, a genuine issue of material fact does not exist regarding Edwin Skinner's negligence, and summary judgment should have been affirmed. Judge Schoonover argued that Edwin Skinner met his burden of demonstrating the absence of a material fact from which a jury could infer negligence. The burden then shifted to the plaintiffs, John and Karen James, to come forward with counter-evidence to reveal a genuine issue of fact, a burden they did not meet, citing Landers v. Milton. The dissent asserted that the mere fact the horses were at large and the gate was open does not, by itself, justify an inference of negligence, referencing Lee v. Hinson. Edwin Skinner had testified he provided adequate fencing, a proper gate, and that the horses had never escaped before. He also stated the latching mechanism was difficult to operate even after the nail was bent. The dissent found no evidence to contradict Edwin Skinner's testimony or to suggest the latch could be operated by non-human means, concluding that the inference that a horse could unlatch a taut, difficult-to-latch chain was unreasonable.
Analysis:
This case highlights the stringent burden on a party moving for summary judgment in Florida, particularly in negligence cases. It clarifies that even if a defendant provides sworn testimony denying negligence and detailing security measures, if a reasonable inference of potential failure (e.g., a gate latch's vulnerability to animal interaction) can be drawn from the physical facts or description, summary judgment may be inappropriate. The decision reinforces that the moving party must conclusively negate all reasonable inferences of negligence to prevail at the summary judgment stage, rather than merely presenting a plausible defense. It underscores the importance of a jury in resolving questions where competing inferences of negligence could arise from circumstantial evidence.
