James Mammone, III v. Charlotte Jenkins

Majority - Julia Smith Gibbons

No, the district court did not err in denying James Mammone's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, as the state court's adjudication of his claims regarding pretrial publicity, juror prayer, and ineffective assistance of counsel was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, nor based on an unreasonable determination of facts. Regarding pretrial publicity, the Sixth Circuit affirmed that the Ohio Supreme Court reasonably applied federal law by distinguishing Mammone's case from those requiring a presumption of prejudice. Unlike Rideau v. Louisiana, Mammone's confession was printed in a newspaper over four months before trial, not repeatedly televised weeks before, and he himself was responsible for its dissemination. The state court's voir dire process, including extensive questionnaires and questioning, demonstrated effective screening for impartial jurors. The court deferred to the trial court's assessment of juror impartiality, as permitted by Supreme Court precedent. On the issue of jurors praying before penalty-phase deliberations, the court found no Supreme Court precedent holding that juror prayer constitutes extraneous information influencing a verdict. It distinguished the situation from cases involving prosecutorial misconduct, and held that Ohio Rule of Evidence 606(B), which bars juror testimony about internal deliberations, was constitutionally applied because prayer is an internal factor, not an external influence. Concerning the ineffective assistance of trial counsel (IAC) claims: The claim that counsel should have pursued a not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) defense was procedurally defaulted for not being raised in state court and could not be excused under Martinez or Trevino because the underlying claim lacked substantial merit. Counsel reasonably relied on their expert, Dr. Smalldon, who concluded Mammone knew the wrongfulness of his acts, consistent with Ohio law. The claim that counsel failed to present evidence of autism spectrum disorder (ASD) was also procedurally defaulted and lacked substantial merit. Counsel's reliance on Dr. Smalldon, who did not diagnose ASD, was a reasonable strategic choice. The claim that counsel failed to retain a neuropsychologist was denied on the merits by state courts and reviewed under the 'doubly deferential' AEDPA standard. Counsel retained Dr. Smalldon, a psychologist experienced in neuropsychological assessments, who screened for brain damage. It was reasonable for counsel to rely on his opinion. The claim that counsel was ineffective for allowing Mammone to make a five-hour unsworn statement was denied on the merits by state courts and reviewed under the 'doubly deferential' AEDPA standard. The decision to permit the statement was a reasonable strategic choice, as it allowed Mammone to present his background and beliefs directly to the jury. Moreover, the statement largely amplified his prior confession, and Mammone failed to show prejudice given the overwhelming aggravating evidence. Finally, for the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim, the Ohio Supreme Court's denial was reasonable. While trial counsel erred by arguing Mammone’s mental state under the wrong statutory mitigating factor (§ 2929.04(B)(3)), the jury was instructed on the catch-all provision (§ 2929.04(B)(7)), under which they could still consider Mammone's mental state. Mammone failed to show prejudice because the jury is presumed to follow instructions, and the aggravating circumstances far outweighed any mitigating evidence, making a different outcome improbable.