James Henderson v. Robert Wilkie
Unpublished Opinion, 19-1369 (7th Cir. 2020) (2020)
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Rule of Law:
A district court’s denial of a motion for a new trial, predicated on evidentiary rulings, is reviewed for abuse of discretion, and such rulings are upheld unless the appellant bears a heavy burden to show a clear abuse of discretion that prejudiced a substantial right and that the same decision would not have been rendered irrespective of the error. Furthermore, a party waives the right to challenge evidentiary rulings on appeal if they fail to make an adequate offer of proof or make representations to the court that they will not introduce certain evidence.
Facts:
- James Henderson, an African American, joined the VA police department at Edward Hines, Jr. VA Hospital in 1986 and held various positions, including detective.
- In March, Gary Marsh became the chief of police at Hines.
- In September 2013, Chief Marsh decided to fill an open criminal investigator position.
- A job announcement for the criminal investigator position was posted on October 16, 2013, directing applicants to submit thorough resumes detailing their experience.
- Fifteen individuals, including Mr. Henderson and Cary Kolbe (a white male lieutenant at Hines with a history of disciplinary issues), applied for the position.
- A three-person panel reviewed redacted resumes, scoring them based on relevant experience; only the top three scoring candidates proceeded to the interview stage.
- Mr. Henderson's resume received the tenth highest score and did not proceed to the interview panel because it did not describe the details of his responsibilities, while Kolbe's resume detailed extensive experience in conducting and leading investigations, including in the Navy.
- Chief Marsh selected Cary Kolbe for the criminal investigator position, testifying that he chose Kolbe because Kolbe had earned the highest scores on both his resume and interview.
Procedural Posture:
- James Henderson filed an employment discrimination action (alleging race and age discrimination and retaliation) against the Secretary of the Department of Veteran Affairs ("VA") in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
- The district court granted summary judgment to the VA.
- Mr. Henderson appealed the summary judgment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (as appellant), and the VA was the appellee.
- A panel of the Seventh Circuit vacated the summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, finding a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the VA’s explanations for not selecting Mr. Henderson were pretext for racial discrimination (Mr. Henderson had abandoned his age discrimination and retaliation claims).
- On remand, the parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge in the district court.
- Mr. Henderson’s race discrimination claim was tried by a jury in September 2018.
- The jury returned a verdict for the VA, and the district court entered final judgment.
- Mr. Henderson moved for a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) in the district court, claiming error in two evidentiary rulings.
- The district court denied Mr. Henderson's motion for a new trial.
- Mr. Henderson timely appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (as appellant).
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Issue:
Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying James Henderson's motion for a new trial, which alleged error in the exclusion of evidence related to the selecting official's discriminatory intent and the selected candidate's post-selection disciplinary issues?
Opinions:
Majority - Ripple
No, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying James Henderson's motion for a new trial based on its evidentiary rulings, as Mr. Henderson failed to meet the heavy burden of demonstrating a clear abuse of discretion or that his substantial rights were affected, and many of his arguments were waived. First, regarding the exclusion of testimony from Mr. Henderson's witnesses on subjects not disclosed in interrogatory answers (VA's first motion in limine), the district court never actually issued a definitive ruling, instead deferring the decision and urging the parties to confer. Crucially, Mr. Henderson's counsel explicitly told the court that he did not intend to elicit such testimony unless the VA "opened the door," which constituted a waiver. Moreover, Mr. Henderson failed to make an offer of proof, leaving no basis to assess potential prejudice. Second, concerning the exclusion of evidence regarding events post-dating the selection process (VA's fifth motion in limine), the district court acted within its discretion. The court reasonably excluded evidence of Chief Marsh's alleged discriminatory actions against other African Americans after Kolbe's selection, applying Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Such evidence would have created "trials within a trial," confusing the jury, and its slight additional probative value was outweighed by the risk of jury confusion. Mr. Henderson's new arguments concerning other evidence were also waived for not being raised to the district court. Third, the exclusion of Kolbe's post-selection disciplinary issues was also appropriate. Mr. Henderson waived this issue by omitting it from his motion for a new trial and making only a passing reference on appeal. Even if not waived, such evidence was largely irrelevant to Chief Marsh's discriminatory animus at the time of hiring and was properly excludable under Rule 403 due to its prejudicial nature. The court concluded that Mr. Henderson failed to meet the heavy burden required to overturn the district court's discretionary evidentiary rulings, and even if any error occurred, it was harmless given the strong evidence against Mr. Henderson, whose candidacy effectively ended due to a low score in a blind resume analysis.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the strict procedural hurdles for challenging evidentiary rulings on appeal, underscoring the necessity of specific and timely offers of proof to preserve a litigant's rights. It reinforces the broad discretion afforded to trial courts in balancing the probative value of evidence against its potential for unfair prejudice, jury confusion, or creating 'mini-trials' under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. The decision also serves as a critical reminder that a party's strategic choices and representations to the court during litigation can lead to a waiver of arguments on appeal, emphasizing the importance of a coherent and meticulously executed trial strategy.
